

REVIEW OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

**SHIMLA**



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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The review process involved a number of consultation meetings and workshops in the cities. The support of the city government and State Government departments/institutions is highly appreciated.

Specifically we would like to highlight the support and in-depth engagement of the City Project Coordinators from all the seven cities.

A word of special thanks to United Nations Development Programme (India) for their fruitful partnership throughout the implementation of the review process, for their valuable support in coordinating the activities as well as in organizing city missions, and for stakeholder consultations and city workshops.

The findings of the review have been shared and reviewed by the key stakeholders, including the Local Government and their valuable inputs have been incorporated in the final report.

The report takes into account the End-to-End Early Warning System approach of the Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System. This report has been prepared by a six member team with experience in areas of disaster risk management, the hazard risk assessment, early warning system design and climate risk management.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Advancements in observation and monitoring, mathematical modelling, computing capabilities, communication technology and conduct of scientific risk assessment have allowed technical and disaster management agencies to disseminate timely and accurate warnings and move people and assets from the harm's way. One example of this is the case of Cyclone Phailin, where accurate forecast was made by the Indian Meteorological Department (Cyclone Warning Division) and timely dissemination of warnings to at-risk communities was done by the Orissa State and the District Agencies. Another example is the case of public health. Systemic collection of registered cases and observation of diseases in the city of Surat have led to the provision of timely information on potential outbreaks. Advance information on potential outbreaks leads to identification of additional measures to be stepped up by the local government to reduce the risk of diseases such as malaria, dengue, cholera, filariasis, among others.

India is highly diverse in terms of geography and climate and so are its cities. Cities are exposed to earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, heavy precipitation, floods, heat waves, cyclone and severe winds, public health risks among others. Past disasters have shown significant impact on city economy and on key sectors (such as transport, energy, water and sanitation, trade and commerce). It is expected that due to climate variability and climate change, the frequency and intensity of the hydro-meteorological hazards will see an increase in future. This, combined with poor reservoir management practices, especially in cities located downstream the reservoirs, may put the lives of citizens and city assets at risk.

Adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) during the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (2005, Japan) has led to a paradigm shift in disaster risk management from a post-disaster response to a comprehensive and strategic approach in disaster risk management encompassing preparedness and prevention strategies. The second high priority area of the HFA stresses the need for identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning.

This review is commissioned by UNDP under Contract (2013/067), and is an initiative under the programme titled, "GoI-UNDP Climate Risk Management in Urban Areas through Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Project". The review investigates the condition of EWS governance, requirements of EWS users, core services provided by technical and disaster management agencies, coordination mechanism between technical and disaster management agencies and finally the issues centred on service delivery and feedback in seven cities (Bhubaneswar, Gangtok, Madurai, Navi Mumbai, Shimla, Trivandrum and Vishakapatnam). The report provides firsthand guidance as well as the steps for development of EWS from the city level to the urban local body (ULB), disaster management institutions, technical agencies involved in design and implementation of early warning systems for geological hazards, hydro-meteorological hazards and public health risks.

## Methodology of Review

The assessment involved a systematic flow of understanding the EWS governance at the national, state, district and city levels; institutional mechanism and their roles within the elements of EWS; delivery of products and services by technical and disaster management agencies, as well as their coordination mechanism/operational cooperation; reviewing the existing EWS mechanism in cities; role of agencies in EWS and their integration in the disaster management institutional framework (City Disaster Management Plan); discussing with stakeholders the needs in EWS and gaps thereof, capacities of institutions (technical agencies) engaged in EWS, the operational cooperation of technical agencies with the emergency departments/functionaries at the district and city levels (emergency management structure and response capabilities), current status and future needs of observation and monitoring capabilities, data management systems; seeking information on pre-computed assessment of risks for various intensity of hazards (risk assessment), hazard analysis and prediction capabilities (threat assessment/potential impact assessment), warning formulation/issuing of guidance and potential outlook/provision of actionable early warning information/warning products, decision making, generation of tailored risk information and dissemination of risk information to at-risk communities or hot-spot locations (risk communication), information technology and telecommunication capabilities, preparation of response options, institution/emergency responders and community response.

The assessment was based on the information obtained through a set of processes.

- Design of the review framework by the Review Team

- A checklist and questionnaire prepared by the Review Team for obtaining information from technical and disaster management agencies
- Mission to select cities to understand the EWS environment
- Development of Criteria Development Matrix taking into consideration all the key elements of end-to-end EWS
- Information collected through stakeholder consultations/meetings, workshops in respective cities, discussions with programme focal point in cities, meeting with key experts
- Exchange and mid-term feedback from UNDP programme team
- Development of policy brief, where key recommendations cited are discussed for endorsement at the policy level
- Workshop with city stakeholders, sharing of results
- Final report and presentation

### Key Observations and Recommendations

Based on the development stage indicators for all the six components (1. EWS governance – national, state and city level institutional framework, 2. User needs, 3. Operational components of EWS, 4. Products and services across the warning chain, 5. Coordination mechanism, 6. Service delivery and feedback loops), the report provides the summary for each city highlighting the current status. The Criteria Development Matrix also outlines the reason for selecting the development stage indicators. Specific recommendations are presented together and this will lead to the development of policy brief.

The overall analysis of this review revealed that in

cities:

- EWS development is crucial for sustainable development and building resilience of the cities. It is therefore important to develop an EWS framework and strengthen strategies across all levels to ensure better coordination efforts for functional EWS at the city level. This must be seen as opportunity to strengthen network among institutions, foster partnerships and build the capacities of all key stakeholders.
- EWS framework must be made as a functional component of the DM Plan process (national/state/district/city). The framework must foster areas of cooperation in data sharing and impact forecasting.
- It is widely realized that city institutions are being rather response-centric instead of being the ones that take preventive measures. The technical capacity in understanding DRR, risk assessment and EWS needs to be strengthened at the ULB level. City level hazard and vulnerability mapping capabilities need to be enhanced on priority basis. A long-term perspective on capacity development should be envisaged.
- There is a common challenge in the interpretation of the forecast products. Technical agencies involved in providing warning have to evolve in providing information that can either be used by a wide pool of users or create products based on user needs.
- Technical agencies/scientific institutions must also enhance the capability to deliver timely warnings with sufficient respite time so that they support DRR functions at the city level.
- The role of technical agencies in warning formulation is increasingly being recognized. It is therefore important to strengthen institutional coordination mechanism between technical and disaster management agencies at all levels.
- City government/ULB has to make significant

investments towards development of EWS and associated mechanisms such as a functional EOC. The current level of preparedness and resource allocation is not sufficient to kick-start any activity around EWS.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACWC	Area Cyclone Warning Centre
ADM	Additional District Magistrate
BMC	Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation
BSNL	Bhartiya Sanchar Nigam Limited
BUDA	Bhubaneswar Urban Development Authority
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDM	Criteria Development Matrix
CDMO	Chief District Medical Officer
CDP	City Development Plan
CDPO	Child Development Project Officer
CESU	Central Electricity Supply Utility
CFO	Chief Fire Officer
CMO	Chief Municipal Officer
CWC	Central Water Commission
DCP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
DDMA	District Disaster Management Authority
DM	Disaster Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EOC	Emergency Operation Centre
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EWS	Early Warning System
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
GOI	Government of India
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IC	Incident Commander
IDSP	Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme
IMD	India Meteorological Department
INCOIS	Indian National Center for Ocean Information Services
IRS	Incident Response System
IT	Information Technology
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MHRVA	Multi Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
MSK	Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik Intensity Scale
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSDMA	Odisha State Disaster Management Authority
PAS	Public Addressal System

PHD	Public Health Department
RFP	Request for Proposal
RIMES	Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia
RSMC	Regional Specialized Meteorological Centre
RTSMN	Real Time Seismic Monitoring Network
SDMA	State Disaster Management Authority
SEOC	State Emergency Operations System
SMS	Short Messaging Service
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRC	State Resource Center
ULB	Urban Local Body
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WRD	Water Resource Department

## GLOSSARY

### Capacity

The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organization that can be used to achieve agreed goals

### Climate change

The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change as: “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use”

### Disaster

A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources

### Disaster risk reduction

The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events

### Early warning system

The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss

### Forecast

Definite statement or statistical estimate of the likely occurrence of a future event or conditions for a specific area

### Geological hazard

Geological process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage

### Hazard

A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage

### Hydro-meteorological hazard

Process or phenomenon of atmospheric, hydrological or oceanographic nature that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage

### Natural hazard

Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage

### Preparedness

The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions

### Prevention

The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters

**Response**

The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected

**Risk**

The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences

**Risk assessment**

A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend

**Risk management**


The systematic approach and practice of managing uncertainty to minimize potential harm and loss


**Vulnerability**


The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard


*Source: 2009, UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction*


## LIST OF ICONS


- 


Background information on Review of EWS in 7 cities in India under the ongoing initiative of Climate Risk Management in Urban Areas through Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation project by UNDP.
- 


Methodology/Systematic approach adopted to assess the existing EWS and emergency communication network in 7 cities across India.
- 

The Criteria Development Matrix indicates the possibility of thinking 5 stages of development and helps to review each criterion built around 6 components of the development model of EWS.
- 


General city information like location, climate, demographics, landuse, administration, etc. helps to understand the city and its development of Disaster Management Plan.
- 


Hazard Risk like geo-physical, hydro-meteorological and public health are studied for each city, which would help in reviewing of EWS and later in development of Disaster Management Plan.
- 


The city and its infrastructure are vulnerable to incidences of both geo-physical & hydro-meteorological events. Such event is likely to affect the livelihood of population in addition to economic loss.
- 


Study of Institutional Framework for a city helps to understand the coordination mechanism among various stakeholders, during the time of disaster.
- 


Summary of all the criteria of all 6 components of study framework and discussed in brief.


- 


Earthquake
- 

Tsunami
- 


Landslide
- 


Cyclone
- 


Flood
- 


Heatwave
- 


Public health risk


- 


Observation and Monitoring
- 


Data Analysis
- 


Prediction
- 

Risk Assessment
- 

Potential Impact Assessment
- 

Warning Formulation
- 

Dissemination to communities at risk
- 

Preparation of Response
- 

Community Response



## 1. INTRODUCTION

A systematic approach towards managing risk through an established early warning system (EWS) can minimize loss of lives and adverse economic impact. EWS backed with effective institutional arrangements can predict hazards in a timely and effective manner, thereby empowering decision makers and communities at risk.

Adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) during the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (2005, Japan) has led to a paradigm shift in disaster risk management from a post-disaster response to a comprehensive and strategic approach in disaster risk management encompassing preparedness and prevention strategies. The second high priority area of the HFA stresses the need for identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning.

In recent years hazards of different origin have caused significant loss of lives and economic damages. The damages are showing a growing trend, and increase in climate variability and climate change can tip of many existing mechanisms of managing risk. A closer look into the nature of the hazard events clearly indicates the role of the technical agencies (national/regional/state/city) and the disaster management agencies (at the national/state/district/city/village) in early warning as critical. The increasing factor of risk in today's society underlines the need for enhanced cooperation from a wide spectrum of stakeholders in effective risk reduction and emergency response.

At a national level there is a growing reliance upon EWS as more people and assets are being exposed to the hazards. This calls for functional EWS (most effective for events that take time to normally develop, such as tropical cyclone) or Alert Systems (most effective for events that start immediately, such as earthquake) that have applicability for most hazards. In 2013, Government of Orissa agencies evacuated more than half million people in advance of tropical cyclone (Phailin, Category: Very Severe Cyclonic Storm) thereby reducing fatalities to a fraction (loss of human life - 21) when compared to the fatalities (loss of human life - 9887) from a tropical cyclone (Paradip Cyclone, Category: Super Cyclonic Storm) in the same region 14 years previously.

Advancements in observation and monitoring, mathematical modelling, computing capabilities, communication technology and conduct of scientific risk assessment have allowed technical and disaster management agencies to timely disseminate accurate warnings and move people and assets from the harm's way. In the case of Cyclone Phailin, accurate forecast by the Indian Meteorological Department (Cyclone Warning Division) and timely dissemination of warnings to at-risk communities by the Orissa State and the District Agencies made this possible.

The other example is in the case of Public Health. Systemic collection of registered cases and observations of diseases in the city of Surat has led to the provision of timely information regarding potential outbreaks. Advance information of potential outbreaks leads to identification of additional measures to be stepped up by the local government to reduce the risk of diseases such as malaria, dengue, cholera, filariasis, among others.

Warning dissemination and staging response actions are as important as accurate forecasting and determining potential impact. Any weak link in the elements of EWS (even in case of previous well performing system) will result in under-performance or its failure. Hence evaluation of EWS is important. The evaluation of the system effectiveness can be done during the event, post-event or during the lean period. This review of EWS for all the seven cities is done during the lean period. In most cases the cities haven't formally put in place a functional EWS. While it is important to have technical competence around a range of elements (forecasting, prediction, impact assessment), discussions with stakeholders emphasize that EWS is more organizational and institutional process which works to reduce loss. The methodology adopted in the study has roots to EWS elements defined by RIMES (2008) and the criteria-development concept by Parker (1999).

The review investigates into the condition of EWS governance, requirements of EWS users, core services provided by technical and disaster management agencies, coordination mechanism between technical and disaster management agencies and finally on issues centered around service delivery and feedback.

The purpose of this report is to provide guidance to the city government, disaster management institutions and technical agencies involved in design and implementation of early warning systems for geological hazards, hydro-meteorological hazards & public health risks. This study aims to assess the existing EWS in seven cities (Refer Figure 1) through:

- Review of the technical design/structure and efficacy of existing early warning system, assessment of early warning agencies, communications networks, protocols for issue

of warning, and transmission to the people, assessment of how the residents of the city access the information and how they act upon it.

- Review of the technologies involved in the early warning system network design, technical specifications, up-time performance standards, connectivity and integration with all the important facilities and installations, emergency services, and the disaster management system in the city.
- Review of the mode of collecting information related to hazard events, monitoring, and transmitting it to other agencies, particularly the municipal government and district administration.
- Review of the mode and reach of the warning especially last mile connectivity and dissemination plan through mass media, print and audio-visual.
- Review the messages disseminated through the EWS: on timeliness, appropriateness, accuracy, and simplicity parameters.
- Review of the service support for maintaining the EWS on a regular basis and ensuring hundred percent uptime.

This report reviews the institutional mechanism and the decision making across the development model of EWS and its components. This report considers the use of Criteria Development Matrix (tool for review) to assess the level of development and present the findings for seven urban centres. Specifically, it focuses on the geological hazard, hydro-meteorological hazard and public health risk warning system, their current status, and capabilities and supporting disaster risk reduction.

Case studies of best practices and warning system for individual hazards are presented at the end of the city review sections for ready reference.



Figure 1: **Seven cities selected for review of EWS**



## Background

Early warning in the usual context means some form of, either written or verbal indication of, an impending hazard. Early warning in the disaster context implies the means by which a potential danger is detected or forecast and an alert issued. In this report, the following definition has been taken into consideration: 'The provision of timely and effective information, through identifying institutions, that allows individuals exposed to the hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for an effective response.' ISDR 2004

Over the last decade, India has incorporated disaster-reduction policies in its national, social and economic development plans to establish effective preparedness measures and improve the response capacities. The value of timely and effective warnings in averting losses and protecting resources/development assets becomes apparent. Urban centres are exposed to greater risk due to severe exposure of elements at risk (Mumbai Floods 2005, Surat Floods 2006). Some of the recent events show the rising trend in the number of people being affected by disasters, especially in the urban areas.

Warning represents an added value and function in the overall disaster risk management/disaster risk reduction framework. There are three main abilities that constitute the basis of early warning.

- The first is technical capability to identify a potential risk or the likelihood of occurrence of a hazardous phenomenon, which threatens a vulnerable population.
- The second ability is that of identifying accurately the vulnerability of a population to whom a warning has to be directed,

- The third ability, which requires considerable social and cultural awareness, is the communication of information to specific recipients about the threat in sufficient time and with sufficient clarity so that they can take action to avert negative consequences.

Warning systems are only as good as their weakest link. They can, and frequently do, fail in both developing and developed countries for a range of reasons. There are significant decision points for the scientific/technical agencies and the disaster management agencies. These decision points coincide with the phases of the disaster management/emergency management decision stages as shown in Figure 2 (say, for hydro-meteorological event with sufficient lead time).

A range of factors influence the hazard event phase and the emergency phase. They include:

- Lack of standardized EWS framework, which is understood by both technical and disaster management agencies.
- Non-availability of warning information products and services at different temporal and spatial scales, and provision of same information content for various sectors/stakeholders.
- Warning message not being aligned in terms of societal impacts, risk assessment not being undertaken and potential impact assessment being based on either individual understanding or on past experience and being non-scientific.
- Lack of systemization steps for emergency response based on event severity.
- Warning content unable to facilitate appropriate




Figure 2: Highlighting overlay of decision points over standard emergency phase and the weather event decision phase

and timely decision actions at least to those people who are most immediately at risk or are under the influence of the hazard.

An effective early warning system links technical agencies that generate warning information with disaster management/emergency management institutions and finally with communities/people at risk. The end-to-end early warning system (RIMES, 2008) involves the following elements (Figure 3 shows the link between these elements):

1. Observation and monitoring
2. Data processing and analysis
3. Prediction and forecasting
4. Risk assessment
5. Potential impact assessment
6. Warning formulation
7. Dissemination to communities at risk (until the last mile)
8. Preparation of response options
9. Community response, which is shaped by:
  - a. Resourced and practiced emergency response plans
  - b. Risk awareness
  - c. Mitigation programmes
10. Receiving user feedback
11. System adjustment/improvement




Figure 3: Key elements in end-to-end EWS



## 2. METHODOLOGY OF REVIEW

A systematic process was adopted by the Review Team to assess the EWS, particularly with respect to the systems for geological, hydro-meteorological and public health risks in all the seven cities.

The assessment involved a systematic flow of understanding the EWS governance at the national, state, district and city levels; institutional mechanism and their roles within the elements of EWS, delivery of products and services by technical and disaster management agencies, as well as their coordination mechanism/operational cooperation; reviewing of existing mechanism of EWS in cities; role of agencies in EWS and their integration in the disaster management institutional framework (City Disaster Management Plan); discussing with stakeholders the gaps and needs in the EWS, capacities of institutions (technical agencies) engaged in EWS, operational cooperation of technical agencies with the emergency departments/functionaries at the district and city levels (emergency management structure and response capabilities), current status and future needs of observation and monitoring capabilities, data management systems; seeking information on pre-computed assessment of risks for various intensity of hazards (risk assessment), hazard analysis and prediction capabilities (threat assessment/potential impact assessment), warning formulation/issuing of guidance and potential outlook/provision of actionable early warning information/warning products, decision making, generation of tailored risk information and dissemination of risk information to at-risk communities or hot-spot locations (risk communication), information technology and telecommunication capabilities, preparation

of response options, institution/emergency responders and community response.

The assessment was based on the information obtained through a set of processes. They are as follows:

- Design of the review framework by the Review Team
- A checklist and questionnaire prepared by the Review Team for obtaining information from technical and disaster management agencies
- Mission to select cities to understand the EWS environment
- Development of Criteria Development Matrix taking into consideration all the key elements of end-to-end EWS (Figure 3)
- Information collected through stakeholder consultations/meetings, workshops in respective cities, discussions with programme focal point in cities, meeting with key experts
- Exchange and mid-term feedback from UNDP programme team
- Development of Policy Brief, where key recommendations cited are discussed for endorsement at the policy level
- Workshop with city stakeholders, sharing of results
- Final report and presentation

The review includes key criteria as indicated in RFP for following key components:

1. TECHNICAL DESIGN / STRUCTURE AND EFFICACY OF EXISTING EWS: Assessment of early warning agencies, communication networks, protocols for issue of warning and transmission to the people. The review should also assess how the residents of the city access the information and how they act upon it.

2. TECHNOLOGIES INVOLVED IN EWS: Review the network design, technical specifications, up-time performance standards, connectivity and integration with all the important facilities and installations, emergency services, and the DM system in the city.

3. MODE OF COLLECTING HAZARD RELATED INFORMATION (Geological hazards, hydrometeorological hazards and disease risks): Review the mode of collecting information related to hazard events, monitoring, and transmitting it to other agencies, particularly the municipal government and district administration.

4. WARNING OUTREACH AND LAST MILE CONNECTIVITY: Review the mode and reach of the warning especially last mile connectivity and dissemination plan through mass media, print and audio-visual medium.

5. MESSAGE CONTENT AND APPROPRIATENESS: Review the messages disseminated through the EWS: on timeliness, appropriateness, accuracy, and simplicity parameters.

6. SERVICE SUPPORT AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE: Review the service support for maintaining the EWS on a regular basis and ensuring 100 percent uptime.

The schematic diagram (Figure 4) is an illustration of institutional mechanism and decision making around the key warning chain elements. Numbers 1 to 6 in the schematic highlight the core components for evaluating the warning system provided by the technical agencies (national/state/city) to the DM agencies and other DRR stakeholders. The description of the core components and the evaluation principles are summarized below:

1. **EWS GOVERNANCE:** National, State and City Level Institutional Framework: EWS is underpinned by ministry/department/technical institutions providing operational nowcast/forecasts, products and services to a wide range of users/community. EWS in India is underpinned by legislation (DM Act 2005, State Disaster Management Act, State Disaster Management Policy) and institutional framework that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders among the key warning chain elements. Emphasis under this component was given towards understanding of the organizational coordination and cooperation mechanism (decision making and feedback across key warning elements), and allocation of resources at the city level (functional EOC, risk assessment, human resource capacity).

2. **USER NEEDS:** The users in the city are spread across government agencies (district DM authority, municipal corporation city DM authority/local authority, emergency services, first responders); communities at risk; general public; NGOs/CBOs; urban service providers (government and private: line departments such as water supply, storm water drainage, drainage, sanitation, health, transportation, energy, law and order); various sectors of the economy including business establishments, trade and commerce; and the media. The requirements and needs of EWS products and services vary among different users.

3. **OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS:** The tasks of the technical agencies and disaster management agencies include developing products and offering a range of services across the warning chain elements. Observation, monitoring, prediction analysis and operational forecasting are

core capacities to be exhibited by the technical agencies. The technical agencies rely on a range of supporting functions such as data gathering, data analysis, IT and telecommunication services and product development through qualified and trained staff. The prediction/operational forecast of hazard onset and hazard intensity are to be further translated into the potential impact assessment at the city level and the surrounding regions. In case of the city having a reservoir/dam located upstream, regional forecast needs to further take into account the opening of the reservoir gates and subsequent inundation scenarios for emergency release.

Risk assessment, risk communication and preparedness for emergency response/evacuation are the responsibilities of the local government/DM stakeholders (as identified in the City DM Plan). Guidelines and procedures typically follow the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) as outlined in the City DM Plan. A sufficient number of qualified and trained staff undertakes the response functions through designated Emergency Support Functions (ESF). The nerve centre of operations during emergency is the City Emergency Operation Centre (EOC equipped with tools for decision support), which functions as the main hub for all emergency functions during the onset of hazard and during the impact, and shall remain operational until the threat phenomenon subsides. Organizational coordination and cooperation mechanism between ESFs are essential for effective delivery of early warning produced/generated by technical agencies.

City-level product development includes outputs derived from risk assessment studies, tailored risk information generated for the event, relevant information technology and telecommunication services for outreach and capability to handle emergency response.

4. **PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ACROSS THE WARNING CHAIN:** A wide range of products and services aid in decision making. While technical agencies undertake hazard monitoring, detection, analysis, prediction and forecasting (issue advisories to key stakeholders for initiating decisions), risk information will have to be tailored to the requirements of the city and communities at risk.

5. **COORDINATION MECHANISM:** A large number of institutions are involved in the warning chain elements. Each institution plays an essential role and there is a need for synergy and collaboration between forecasting (warning, data exchange through hydro-meteorological services, climate services, public health etc.) and DM agencies. It is important to analyse if there are any specific provisions of expertise by the technical agencies to the DM stakeholders that could support or enhance decision making.

6. **SERVICE DELIVERY AND FEEDBACK LOOPS:** While technical agencies issue the forecast and related warning, DM agencies have to understand the user needs and ensure effective and timely delivery of the services (overarching capacities in quality management system is essential for service delivery across functions). Feedback mechanism across the warning element chain helps in improving delivery/quality of product and services over time.

The elements of EWS and components have been integrated into the development of Criteria Development Matrix (CDM).




Figure 4: **Study framework schematic showing the links of stakeholders across the development model of EWS**  
 Note: Various components analysed are numbered (as in the text) in the schematic



### 3. CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT MATRIX AND DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS FOR EWS

The review of EWS employs a range of criteria across six components and subsequent assessment to arrive at the level of development. Based on the past research and studies, the study has adopted the Criteria Development Matrix to review EWS in seven cities. The Criteria Development Matrix indicates the possibility of considering five stages of development for each criterion built around the six components of the development model of EWS. The Criteria Development Matrix will indicate the progress as basic (Stage 1 development, which is

characterized as rudimentary) to the most advanced (Stage 5 development, which is characterized as current state-of-art and is judged to have reached the fully developed stage containing no major shortcomings). Stages 2, 3 and 4 are characterized as intermediate stages of development. Each of the disaster warnings (hydro-meteorological services, ocean services, climate services and public health services) will be assessed against each criterion and each development stage shall produce a profile indicating the overall stage of development (thereby highlighting gaps and perspective paths for improvement). The level of development stage is based on existing conditions and this can be modified based on the signs of improvement

towards a robust EWS at the city level. Subsequent criteria may be added on in further studies or comprehensive EWS audit exercise.

Criteria Development Matrix has been developed through several rounds of discussions by the review team and is in close alignment to the context of EWS development in India. Table 1 highlights six components identified for the review. It defines 35 criteria and details the development stage for each of the criteria. In the review for each city, specific comments/remarks are highlighted for selection of the development stage for each criterion. An overall score indicates the performance of EWS in the city.

Table 1: **Criteria development matrix: Criteria and indicators of the condition of ews in cities**

S. NO.	COMPONENT 1	EWS GOVERNANCE - CITY LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
1.1	State legislation for EWS framework includes local authority (Urban Local Body) as an integral part ( <b>document, control to the ULB</b> )	Not envisaged	Need is realized, changes in legislation are in process	In place, but not implemented	In place, partially implemented	In place and implemented
1.2	Institutional mechanism for Local Authority (ULB) is an integral part of EWS framework ( <b>document, mandate, implementation</b> )	Not envisaged	Need is realized, changes in institutional mechanism are being brought about	In place, but mandate remains unclear	In place, but partially implemented	In place and implemented
1.3	ULB accorded with the authority to disseminate warnings ( <b>mandate, SOP, implementation</b> )	Not envisaged	Mandate does not exist but informal dissemination happens	Mandate exists for dissemination with no SOP in place	Mandate and SOPs in place, implementation not effective	Mandate and SOP in place with effective implementation
1.4	Extent of preparedness and prevention actions evident among state technical and disaster management agencies ( <b>relevant department DM Plan at state, SOPs, link from state to city</b> )	Select departments have DM Plan, but it is not implemented	All departments have DM Plan, partially implemented	All departments have DM Plan and SOP in place and implemented, but not integrated across	All departments have DM Plan, SOP in place, implemented and integrated across state departments	All departments have DM Plan, SOP in place, implemented, integrated across state departments and with links to the city

S. NO.	COMPONENT 2	USER NEEDS				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
2.1	Hotspots identified for potential hazard impact (identified, mapped and updated)	Hotspots not identified	Hotspots vaguely identified through past incidence records, not demarcated	Hotspots identified and mapped across city for selected hazards	Hotspots identified and mapped across the city for all hazards, not updated at regular intervals	Hotspots identified and zone of demarcation updated on regular intervals
2.2	Outreach practice (dissemination of warning)	No formal practice for any hazard	Only for select hazards to key government institutions and media	All hazards to key government institutions and media	All government institutions, media, community based organizations	Last mile connectivity established (End-to-End), specific information to select vulnerable communities
2.3	Timely dissemination of warnings to vulnerable groups (residing in slums, high risk prone areas)	No specific warning for vulnerable groups exists in the city	Dissemination of warning exists to some extent	Dissemination of warning exists for select hazards, but with limited respite time	Dissemination of warning exists for all hazards, but with limited respite time	Dissemination of warning exists, with sufficient respite time
2.4	Arrangement for night-time warning (limited to floods, landslides, cyclones, tsunamis)	No specific arrangement for warning in night time	Recognition of the need, planning in progress	Night-time warning is recognized and arrangements reflect this, scope for considerable improvement in dissemination/ outreach	Night-time warning dissemination and outreach established	Warning dissemination tested through conduct of emergency night-time drills/event
2.5	Media engagement in dissemination of warning	Limited coverage, media collects information from respective agencies, shortcomings in communication	Limited coverage of information from respective agencies, technical information presented as received from agencies, shortcomings in communication, problem recognized but not addressed	Media collects and disseminates information, shortcomings are being addressed through collaboration with agencies	Media collects information from technical agencies, timely dissemination of warning to citizens in an understandable format (authenticated value addition)	Standardized content with graphical/iconic representation, near real time updates, citing possible impacts
2.6	Content of warning to general public by local government (ULB) (graphical representation and behavioural content for taking actions at individual/household and community levels)	Limited information	Adequate information for select hazards, but with no behavioural content	Adequate information for relevant hazards, but with no behavioural content	Warning information with graphical, factual representation and general behavioural content at city level	Warning information with graphical, factual representation at ward level and contextual behavioural information provided

S. NO.	COMPONENT 3	OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
<b>TECHNICAL AGENCIES</b>						
3.1	Risk assessment and integration with potential impact assessment (identification, mapping, integration)	Risk assessment does not exist	Risk prone areas identified based on historical data, past disasters and other qualitative information in the form of institutional memory and tabular records	Risk assessment undertaken with technical information and demarcates risk prone administrative units, risk assessment products available in the form of maps and quantitative information	Risk assessment (hazard maps, vulnerability and risk maps) available on GIS platform but not updated periodically and not fully integrated with prediction component to derive potential impact assessment and stage response	Risk assessment updated periodically (available on GIS platform) and fully integrated with prediction component to derive potential impact assessment and stage focused response
3.2.1	Warning mechanism for geophysical hazards: Earthquake, Landslide and Tsunami	Warning mechanism does not exist	Warning exists with no consistency in warning message and inadequate respite time	Consistency in warning message with inadequate respite time	Consistency in warning message with adequate respite time	Advanced warning protocol with adequate respite time (with multiple relay and deactivation process)
3.2.2	Warning mechanism for hydrometeorological hazards: Cyclone, Severe Winds, Stormsurge, Heatwave, Coldwave, Snow, Extreme Rainfall, Fluvial Flood and Pluvial Flood	Warning mechanism does not exist	Warning exists with no consistency in warning message and inadequate respite time	Consistency in warning message with inadequate respite time	Consistency in warning message with adequate respite time	Advanced warning protocol with adequate respite time (with multiple relay and deactivation process)
3.2.3	Warning mechanism for public health risks: Vector borne diseases, Water borne diseases and other communicable diseases	Advisory does not exist	General advisory exists with no indication of areas and vulnerable groups	Advisory exists for vulnerable groups with no demarcation of areas	Demarcation of areas based on active and passive surveillance with time delay, no involvement of private stakeholders	Near real time warning, protocol established, active and passive surveillance along with involvement of private stakeholders
3.3.1	Availability of technology to nowcast/forecast of geophysical hazards by technical agencies	High dependency on national agencies for observation, monitoring and forecasting	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/forecast at regional level, with high dependency on technology available at regional centres	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/forecast at district level	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/forecast at city level	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/forecast at community level/hotspots



S. NO.	COMPONENT 3	OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
3.3.2	Availability of technology in nowcast/ forecast of hydro-meteorological hazards by technical agencies	High dependency on national agencies for observation, monitoring and forecasting	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/forecast at regional level, with high dependency on technology available at regional centres	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/ forecast at district level	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/ forecast at city level	Has sufficient technology to observe, monitor and nowcast/ forecast at community level/hotspots
3.3.3	Disease surveillance system (surveillance coverage, collection method, analysis)	Surveillance exists at district level using paper-based forms; analysis undertaken at district level	Surveillance exists at city level within government hospitals using paper-based forms; analysis undertaken at city level	Surveillance exists at city level within government hospitals, private hospitals and all clinics; using paper-based forms; analysis undertaken at city level	Surveillance exists at city level within government hospitals, private hospitals and all clinics; using computerized data collection; analysis and mapping undertaken at community level	Detailed surveillance is carried out on a near real time basis, disease forecast information is made available for decision making
3.4	Uncertainty in forecast and warning: Geophysical hazards, Hydro-meteorological hazards and Public health risks	Forecast/warning does not exist	Forecast exists with high uncertainty, and no warning exists	Forecast exists with high uncertainty, followed by incomprehensible warning	Warning based on forecast exists, with medium degree of uncertainty	Warning based on forecast exists, with low degree of uncertainty
<b>DISASTER MANGEMENT AGENCY / LOCAL AUTHORITY (ULB)</b>						
3.5	Budget allocation by the local authority for EWS	Budget head doesn't exist	Budget head doesn't exist, currently being spent from miscellaneous heads	Need for DM budget head realized, plan to incorporate budget for Disaster Management	Budget exists for DM, no specific budget head exists for EWS	Budget exists for DM, specific sub-head for EWS exists
3.6	Data availability for operations of EWS	Data available with different agencies in multiple formats, not collated or aggregated, qualitative information available	Data is collated from different departments, partial digitization undertaken but not updated regularly; currently not in usable format	Data is collated and updated regularly, limited quality assurance and quality control, temporal data available, spatial data not available, data is of limited use	Data is collated and updated regularly, quality assurance and quality control, temporal and spatial data available, data available in limited usable format	Standardized spatial and temporal data are collated and updated regularly for city EWS, single window system exists for data updation and dissemination, data available in usable format

S. NO.	COMPONENT 3	OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
3.7	Staffing and capacity within local authority for operation and maintenance of EWS	No dedicated staff for EWS	Staff deputed on need basis, not specifically trained for operating EWS	Manpower hired on short-term basis, limited training and capacity building provided	Staff assigned for EWS but with multiple responsibility (other than EWS), limited training and capacity building provided	Dedicated specialized staff assigned for city EWS, training and capacity building of staff conducted at regular intervals
3.8	Use of modern technology to disseminate warnings	Generic media – newspapers, local cable channel and radio	In addition to generic media, public addressal system (PAS) in place, but limited to siren	In addition to generic media, PAS in place, but limited to siren and digital display at select locations	Fixed and vehicle mounted PAS, digital/ electronic display screen at select locations, mobile (SMS), web, community radio	State-of-art alert and warning system, dedicated channel, online dissemination system
3.9	Redundancy (multi-mode) in communication networks	None	Recognition of need, no special arrangements made	Recognition of the need and development in process	Warning system reflects the arrangement, partially developed, but scope for considerable improvement	Well-developed redundancy in communication network
3.10	City Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) for housing information related to hazard, vulnerability and risk	EOC does not exist	EOC is activated on a need basis, no information on hazard/ vulnerability and risk	Need for permanent EOC recognized by ULB, and development in progress	EOC established with limited technical and human resource support, and has information on hazard/ vulnerability and risk	EOC established with adequate technical and human resources (manned 24X7), SOP for EOC, systems exist to provide risk information and disseminate it to stakeholders for preparedness and response on near real time basis

S. NO.	COMPONENT 4	PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ACROSS THE WARNING CHAIN				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
4.1	Degree of local details incorporated in warnings	Only generalized warnings from technical agencies	Generalized warnings from technical agencies, need for incorporation of local details is recognized, system under development	City level macro details are incorporated within warnings	Ward details (including hot spots) are incorporated within warnings	Sub-ward/locality/ community details incorporated in warnings (including ward, hotspots); measures cited to take action
4.2	Raising awareness about warnings at city level	No efforts are being made to sensitize citizens	Efforts are made to raise public awareness on frequent hazards, need basis	Awareness programmes on frequent hazards and their risks are conducted on regular/seasonal intervals, special population needs are also not addressed and programme not evaluated	Comprehensive programmes on all hazards and their risks are conducted on regular basis, special population needs addressed, but programme not evaluated	Comprehensive programmes on all hazards and their risks are conducted to raise the level of public awareness, programme regularly evaluated and strengthened
4.3	Ability of technical agencies and disaster management institutions to cater to early warning products and services to user specific requirements	User need assessment not undertaken	User need assessment undertaken, products identified	Products generated for select hazards catering to selected users	Products generated for select hazards catering to selected users, details available to take actions	Products generated for all hazards catering to all users, and details available to take actions
4.4	Risk communication	Risk assessment does not exist, hence no communication	Risk not assessed in local context, information generated by technical agencies are transferred and published/disseminated	Risk is assessed in local context and communicated to select stakeholders	Risk communication including preparedness measures are communicated to stakeholders, dissemination is not robust (last mile connectivity is not ensured)	Well-established risk communication mechanism enables stakeholders to manage risk, dissemination is robust (last mile connectivity is ensured)

S. NO.	COMPONENT 5	COORDINATION MECHANISM				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
5.1	Extent of coordination between technical agencies and disaster management agencies	Communication is limited to select agencies	Communication with all agencies exist, coordination does not exist	Communication with all agencies exist, limited coordination exists	Coordination mechanism ensures agencies respond to specific needs	Coordination ensures collective decision making
5.2	Extent of links between disaster management agencies and service providers	No formal links exist, service providers depend on information hosted on public domain	Formal links do not exist, select service providers are informed during the onset of an event	Formal links become active only prior to/ during an event	Formal links become active periodically in anticipation of an event, one way communication initiated from disaster management agency	Formal links become active periodically in anticipation of an event, two way communication established to ensure business continuity, co-benefit achieved
5.3	Extent of links between media and disaster management agencies	Media depend on information hosted on public domain	Limited information is provided to media	Collaboration and reflection of warning information in the media products are evident	Active collaboration exists, understanding of warnings are reinforced through discussions, no value addition	Well-developed links exist, seamless flow of information, value addition to warning is evident

S. NO.	COMPONENT 6	SERVICE DELIVERY AND FEEDBACK LOOPS				
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS				
		1	2	3	4	5
6.1	User community's knowledge of early warning system and its effectiveness	ULB does not have clear understanding of existing early warning systems	ULB is aware of early warnings, but does not initiate action	ULB and service providers are aware of warnings, but impacts are not clear to initiate or coordinate action	ULB and service providers are knowledgeable of warnings and are able to take coordinated action	ULB, service providers and citizens are knowledgeable of warnings and are able to take informed actions
6.2	Extent to which the warning mechanism allows for feedback from affected area	No feedback mechanism exists	Problem recognized and mechanism under development	Feedback mechanism exists, but does not include all stakeholders	Feedback mechanism includes all stakeholders, but is not robust	Feedback mechanism functions in near real time
6.3	Level of reflection and learning evident within local authority	Post event reflection is done, but no change is evident	Post event reflection is done and change is evident in mode of communication	Post event reflection is done and change is evident in communication and response mechanism	Assessment undertaken, change evident in monitoring/forecasting/warning and subsequent increase in respite time	Along with increased respite time there is change in guidelines and standard operating procedures
6.4	Monitoring, evaluation and targets for improvement of EWS	No formal procedure to monitor the EWS performance is in place	Need realized, M&E process is under development	Monitoring of select EWS components are in place, improvement needed	M&E process is in place, not undertaken at regular intervals	M&E process is in place and is being carried out regularly, targets for improvements are outlined


#### 4. UNDERSTANDING EWS AND KEY FRAMEWORKS FOR GEOLOGICAL HAZARDS, HYDRO-METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS AND PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS

Every type of hazard has its own dynamics. The duration of the phenomenon will vary for hazard type and the event type (small or big). There are various stages associated with the development of the event (Figure 5). Broadly, the stages can be categorized as follows:

- Embryonic stage can be linked to the manifestation of those conditions that may give rise to these events or as the events begin to emerge; preliminary phase of the event.
- Growth stage is when the event gradually evolves in terms of its magnitude or area of influence.
- Mature stage would represent the event as being capable of provoking a disaster in a particular geographic location; event triggers impacts and effects on communities and regions near its path.
- Decaying stage that indicates when the event loses its strength and is dissipating.

In the context of early warning, the time lapse between the embryonic and the mature stage is determinant to the capacity of issuing warnings. If this time lapse is large enough, hierarchical phases could be identified allowing for the establishment of several alert or warning levels.

For example, in case of a tropical cyclone in the Indian Ocean, the disturbance that gives rise to the event and subsequent shaping up is considered as embryonic stage. The growth stage would then encompass those processes related to evaporation of water from the ocean and the convective processes within the atmosphere that



**Figure 5: Evolution of an hazard event in four stages**

Source: Villagrán de León, J. C., Pruessner, I., and H. Breedlove (2013). *Alert and Warning Frameworks in the Context of Early Warning Systems. A Comparative Review. Intersections No. 12.* Bonn: United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security.

begin to take shape, such tropical cyclone. In the mature stage, one could see the cyclone as fully manifested in terms of its typical characteristics such as very low barometric pressure, high wind speeds, storm surges and precipitation. Finally, as the cyclone makes landfall, it begins to weaken to the point that it ceases to exist once it is fully inside large landmasses. In this context, meteorologists use a variety of instruments to track the four stages of events. A combination of measurements and computing allows the IMD Cyclone Warning Division to be able to follow the path and the dynamics of such events, leading to forecasts of trajectories and places where such cyclone may make landfall. The disaster management agencies take actions based on the information provided by the technical agencies and follow the Standard Operating Procedure as outlined in the Disaster Management Plan.



#### 4.1 EWS Framework for Earthquake Hazard

Earthquake occurs due to plate tectonic activity. The India sub-continent has a history of devastating earthquakes. Some regions of the country are more risk prone than others. As per the seismic hazard zoning map of India, India is broadly divided into four zones. Zone V is very high damage risk zone (Intensity IX and above on MSK scale); Zone IV is high damage risk zone (Intensity VIII on MSK scale), Zone III is moderate damage risk zone (Intensity VII on MSK scale) and Zone II is low damage risk zone (Intensity VI or less on MSK scale). About 59 per cent of the geographical region of the country falls under Zones III, IV and V.

Studies indicate the possibility of earthquakes of severe intensity in some parts of the country.




Figure 6: **Global earthquake hazard map showing the regions operating active earthquake early warning systems**

Note: labelled in blue. The regions developing early warning systems are labelled in green  
 Source: <http://www.elarms.org/front/eewGlobal.php> Last accessed on 18 April 2014


Given the high vulnerability of the country to damaging earthquakes, there is no functional EWS for earthquake hazard. The growth stage of an earthquake may span across centuries, whereas the phenomenon of ground shaking lasts for seconds to a few minutes. Once the event takes place, the main shock is followed by aftershocks. In some cases, the large earthquake may be preceded by foreshocks. Earthquakes below the ocean bed can trigger tsunami, and on land they can trigger landslides, mudslides, avalanche and rock fall.

Earthquake EWS takes advantage of the rapid availability of earthquake information to quantify the hazard associated with an earthquake and issue a prediction of impending ground motion prior to the arrival of the strong waves in populated areas. Earthquake EWS is a combination of instrumentation, methodology and software designed to analyse and warn the populated areas or sensitive installations. Japan, Taiwan, Mexico, Romania and Turkey currently operate Earthquake EWS, while California (California Integrated Seismic Network, CISEN), Iceland, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Egypt and India are either in the development or testing phase of Earthquake EWS. Figure 6 shows the status of countries where Earthquake EWS is operational.

India Meteorological Department (IMD) is the nodal agency of Government of India responsible for monitoring seismic activity in and around the country. The operational task of the department is to quickly estimate the earthquake source parameters immediately on occurrence of an earthquake and disseminate the information to all the user agencies including the concerned state and central government agencies responsible for carrying out relief and rehabilitation measures.

Information relating to under-sea earthquakes capable of generating tsunamis on the Indian coastal regions is also disseminated to all concerned user agencies, including the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), Hyderabad, for issue of tsunami related messages and warnings. Earthquake information is transmitted to various user agencies, including public information channels, press, media etc. using different modes of communication, such as SMS, fax, email and is also posted on IMD's website ([www.imd.gov.in](http://www.imd.gov.in)).

India Meteorological Department also maintains a countrywide National Seismological Network (NSN), consisting of a total of 82 seismological stations, spread over the entire length and breadth of the country. This includes: (a) 16-station VSAT based digital seismic telemetry system around National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi, (b) 20-station VSAT based Real Time Seismic Monitoring Network in the north-eastern region of the country and (c) 17-station Real Time Seismic Monitoring Network (RTSMN) to monitor and report large magnitude under-sea earthquakes capable of generating tsunamis on the Indian coastal regions. The remaining stations are of standalone/analogue types. A Control Room is in operation on a 24x7 basis, at IMD Headquarters (Seismology) in New Delhi, with state-of-art facilities for data collection, processing and dissemination of information to the concerned user agencies.



#### 4.2 EWS Framework for Tsunami Hazard

Tsunamis are triggered by undersea earthquakes; landslides which reach seas or oceans and underwater landslides; volcanic eruptions and

dome collapse and meteorites. It is important to note that all earthquakes do not cause tsunamis. The tsunami EWS gathered much attention in India largely because of the consequence of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004. Underwater mass movements get triggered by any of the factors mentioned above. The growth of the phenomenon takes place in the sea and it heads straight to the coastline impacting as tsunami waves. Rise in the sea level and impact of tsunami may last for several hours, and there can be several waves associated with a tsunami event.

In the aftermath of the Great Sumatra earthquake of 26 December 2004, the Ministry of Earth Sciences has set up an Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), Hyderabad. The centre is mandated to provide advance warnings on tsunamis that are likely to affect the coastal areas of the country. As a part of this, a 17-station Real Time Seismic Monitoring Network (RTSMN) has been set up by India Meteorological Department.

The network is capable of monitoring and reporting, in least possible time, the occurrence of earthquakes capable of generating tsunamis that are likely to affect the Indian coastal regions. Data from the 17 broadband seismic field stations are transmitted simultaneously in real time through VSAT communication facilities to the Central Receiving Stations (CRSs) located at IMD, New Delhi, and INCOIS, Hyderabad, for processing and interpretation.

The CRSs are equipped with state-of-art computing hardware, communication, data processing, visualization and dissemination facilities. For providing better azimuthal coverage for detecting earthquakes with potential to cause tsunamis, the



RTSMN system has been configured to include about 100 global stations of IRIS (a consortium of Incorporated Research Institutions in Seismology), whose data are available freely through the internet. Information on earthquake is disseminated through various communication channels to all the concerned user agencies in a fully automated mode. Based on the earthquake information provided by the RTSMN and other ocean-related observations/analysis, INCOIS evaluates the potential of the undersea earthquakes to cause tsunami and issues necessary warnings/alerts as per the situation.

The National Tsunami Early Warning Centre at INCOIS is operational since October 2007 and has been issuing accurate tsunami warnings for all undersea earthquakes of  $\geq 6.5$  M as shown in figure 7. The ITEWS comprises a real time network of seismic stations, Bottom Pressure Recorders (BPR), tide gauges and 24X7 operational tsunami warning centre to detect the potential of earthquakes to cause tsunami, to monitor tsunamis and to provide timely advice to vulnerable community by means of latest communication methods with back-end support of a pre-run scenario database and Decision Support System (DSS). Table 2 presents the bulletin types issued by the ITEWC with the timelines.

However, as local conditions would cause a wide variation in tsunami wave action, the ALL CLEAR determination is made by the local authorities. Actions Based on Threat Status (WARNING/ALERT/WATCH) is given in the table 2.

Bulletin Type	Information	Time of Issue (Earthquake origin time as $T_0$ minutes)
Type I	Preliminary EQ parameters and LAND/NO THREAT information based on EQ location, magnitude and depth	$T_0+20$
	Preliminary EQ parameters and qualitative potential of earthquake to cause tsunami, based on EQ location, magnitude and depth	
Type II	Preliminary EQ parameters and NO THREAT information from model scenarios	$T_0+30$
	Preliminary EQ parameters and quantitative tsunami threat (WARNING/ALERT/WATCH) information from model scenarios	
Type II Supplementary - xx	Revised EQ parameters and quantitative tsunami threat (WARNING/ALERT/WATCH) information from model scenarios – if revised EQ parameters are available much before the real time water level observations are reported	As and when revised earthquake parameters are available or after earthquake lapsed Time + 60 min
Type III	Revised EQ parameters and quantitative tsunami threat (WARNING/ALERT/WATCH) information from model scenarios and real time water level observations indicating tsunami generation	As and when the first real time water level observation is available
Type III Supplementary -xx	Revised EQ parameters and quantitative tsunami threat (WARNING/ALERT/WATCH) information from model scenarios and real time water level observations indicating tsunami generation threat PASSED information for individual zones	Hourly update/as and when the subsequent real time water level observations are available
Final Bulletin	Issued when water levels from multiple gauges confirm that no significant tsunami was generated	
	120 minutes after a significant tsunami passes the last Indian threat zone	

*Source: IETWC User Guide Ver. 2, Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, June 2011*

Threat Status	Actions to be taken	Dissemination to
WARNING	Public should be advised to move inland towards higher grounds. Vessels should move into deep ocean	MoES, MHA, NDMA, NCMC, NDRF battalions, SEOC, DEOC, public, media
ALERT	Public should be advised to avoid visiting beaches and low-lying coastal areas Vessels should move into deep ocean	MoES, MHA, NDMA, NCMC, NDRF battalions, SEOC, DEOC, public, media
WATCH	No immediate action is required	MoES, MHA, MoES, MHA, MEDIA, NCMC, NDRF battalions, SEOC, DEOC
THREAT PASSED	All clear determination to be made by the local authorities	MoES, MHA, NDMA, NCMC, NDRF battalions, SEOC, DEOC, public, media

Table 2: **Bulletin types, threat status & action points for tsunami warning alert and watch**



### 4.3 EWS Framework for Landslide Hazard

The term 'landslide' describes a wide variety of processes that result in the downward and outward movement of slope-forming materials, including rock, soil, artificial fill or a combination of these. The materials may move by falling, toppling, sliding, spreading or flowing (USGS). Landslide causes can be classified into four categories:

- **Geological causes:** These include weak, weathered, sheared or fissured materials, adversely-oriented structural discontinuities (faults, unconformity, etc.), and contrasts in permeability and stiffness.
- **Morphological causes:** These include tectonic or volcanic uplift, glacial rebound, fluvial, glacial or wave erosion of slope toe, or vegetation removal (by forest fire, drought).
- **Physical causes :** These include intense rainfall, rapid snow melt; earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, thawing and weathering (freeze and thaw or shrink and swell).
- **Anthropogenic causes :** These include excavation of the slope or its toe, loading of the slope or its crest, deforestation, irrigation, mining, artificial vibration and water leakage from utilities.

Landslide, a frequently occurring natural hazard in the hilly terrains of India, is a predominant activity during the monsoon period from July to September and after the snowfall from January to March. Strong earthquakes also trigger landslides, particularly in regions marked by critically disposed and unstable slopes. On a rough estimate, nearly 15 per cent of India's landmass or 0.49 million sq km area is prone to landslides. This includes 0.098 million sq km of the north-eastern region, comprising the Arakan Yoma ranges, and 0.392 million sq km of parts of the




Figure 7: SOP diagram of tsunami early warning centre

Source: [http://www.tsunami.incois.gov.in/ITEWS/dss\\_sop.jsp](http://www.tsunami.incois.gov.in/ITEWS/dss_sop.jsp) (Last accessed on 18 April 2014)

Himalayas, Nilgiris, Ranchi Plateau, and Eastern and Western Ghats. As many as 20 states of India are affected by different degrees of landslides. Of these, the states of Sikkim and Mizoram have been assessed to be falling under very high to severe hazard classes. Most of the districts in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur come under high to very high landslide hazard classes. In the peninsular region, the hilly tracts of states like Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Goa, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala constitute low to moderate hazard prone zones.

Slope saturation by water is the common trigger of landslides, generated through processes such as intense rainfall, snowmelt, changes in groundwater levels, and water level changes along coastlines, earth dams and the banks of lakes, reservoirs, canals and rivers. Landslides and floods are closely allied because both are related to precipitation, runoff and the saturation of ground by water. In addition, debris flows and mudflows usually occur in small, steep stream channels and often are mistaken for floods; in fact, these two events often occur simultaneously in the same area. Building on the fact that some landslides are triggered by intense rainfall, institutions establish the saturation threshold and develop landslide EWS. The presence of extreme weather conditions is used as an indicator to issue warning or to change the levels of warning in the systems, which make use of various threshold levels.

The study of landslide hazard is carried out by the Geological Survey of India (GSI), and can be divided into two broad categories:

1. Pre-disaster Studies: Identification of vulnerable

slopes through landslide hazard zonation (LHZ) mapping on various scales or studying the critical slopes individually and determining their status as far as their stability is concerned.

2. Post-disaster Studies: Detailed analysis of landslides that have occurred, determine the causes responsible for failure and suggest treatment measures required to stabilize the slopes.

Landslide EWS is not undertaken at the moment by GSI or by other agencies in the country.



#### 4.4 EWS Framework for Tropical Cyclone

A tropical cyclone is a rotational low pressure system in the tropics when the central pressure falls by 5 to 6 hPa from the surroundings and the maximum sustained wind speed reaches 34 knots (about 62 kmph). It is a vast violent whirl of 150 to 800 km, spiralling around a centre and progressing along the surface of the sea at a rate of 300 to 500 km a day. The word cyclone has been derived from the Greek word cyclos, which means 'coiling of a snake'. These events are controlled by the interaction between the atmosphere and the oceans in tropical waters. The stages of the cyclone take from a few days to few weeks. During the mature stage, the tropical cyclone may vary its characteristics in terms of wind speed and pressure based on the interaction. On hitting the land, the system weakens and dissipates. Over the last two decades, there has been significant improvement in the capacities of the institutions to monitor, forecast and warn populations in advance of the cyclone hitting the land. World Meteorological Organization has set up five Regional Specialized Meteorological Centres (RSMC) in Miami, Tokyo,

New Delhi, La Réunion and Nadi.

Based on wind speed over the oceanic area, IMD has classified the low pressure systems into the following categories, from low pressure area to super cyclonic storm:

#### Cyclone Warning Organization Structure in India

RSMC – Tropical Cyclones, New Delhi with effect from 1 July 1988 has been assigned the responsibility of issuing Tropical Weather Outlooks and Tropical Cyclone Advisories for the benefit of the countries in the WMO/ESCAP Panel region bordering the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, namely, Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The main activities of RSMC, New Delhi, are listed below.

- Round-the-clock watch over the entire North Indian Ocean
- Analysis and processing of global meteorological data for diagnostic and prediction purposes
- Detection, tracking and prediction of cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea
- Running of numerical models for tropical cyclone track and intensity prediction
- Issue of Tropical Weather Outlook once daily (at 0600 UTC) and an additional outlook at 1700 UTC in the event of a depression, which is likely to intensify into a cyclonic storm
- Issue of cyclone advisories to the Panel countries eight times a day
- Issue of storm surge advisories
- Implementation of Regional Cyclone Operational Plan of WMO/ESCAP Panel
- Collection, processing and archival of all data pertaining to cyclonic storms, viz., wind, storm surge, pressure, rainfall, satellite information etc.
- Exchange of composite data and bulletins

pertaining to cyclonic storms with Panel countries

- Preparation of comprehensive reports on each cyclonic storm
- Continued research on storm surge, track and intensity prediction techniques

### Cyclone Warning Division

Cyclone Warning Directorate – located with RSMC – Tropical Cyclones, New Delhi, was established in 1990 in the Office of the Director General of Meteorology, New Delhi – to co-ordinate and supervise the cyclone warning work in the country in totality. The mission of this division is to improve the cyclone warning activity in the country and to improve links between early warning system of cyclone and disaster management.

The broad functions of the Cyclone Warning Division and RSMC – Tropical Cyclones, New Delhi are as follows:

- Round-the-clock watch over the entire North Indian Ocean
- Analysis and processing of global meteorological data for diagnostic and prediction purposes
- Detection, tracking and prediction of cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea
- Issue of numbered Cyclone Warning Bulletins to AIR, Doordarshan and other TV channels and print media for wider coverage
- Interaction with disaster management agencies and providing critical information for emergency support services
- Coordination with government & other agencies at HQ level on all matters relating to cyclonic storms
- Collection, processing and archival of all data pertaining to cyclonic storms, viz., wind, storm surge, pressure, rainfall, satellite information etc.
- Preparation of comprehensive reports on each cyclonic storm

System Intensity	Damage Expected	Suggested Action
Low Pressure Area (Not exceeding 17 kts or less than 31 kmph)	--	--
Depression (17–27 kts or 31–51 kmph)	--	--
Deep Depression (28–33 kts or 52–61 kmph)	Minor damage to loose and unsecured structures	Fishermen advised not to venture into the open seas
Cyclonic Storm (34–47 kts or 62–87 kmph)	Damage to thatched huts. Breaking of tree branches causing minor damage to power and communication lines	Total suspension of fishing operations
Severe Cyclonic Storm (48–63 kts or 88–117 kmph)	Extensive damage to thatched roofs and huts. Minor damage to power and communication lines due to uprooting of large avenue trees. Flooding of escape routes	Total suspension of fishing operations. Coastal hutment dwellers to be moved to safer places. People in the affected areas to remain indoors
Very Severe Cyclonic Storm (64–90 kts or 118–167 kmph)	Extensive damage to kutcha houses. Partial disruption of power and communication lines. Minor disruption of road and rail traffic. Potential threat from flying debris. Flooding of escape routes	Total suspension of fishing operations. Mobilize evacuation from coastal areas. Judicious regulation of rail and road traffic. People in affected areas to remain indoors
Very Severe Cyclonic Storm (91–119 kts or 168–221 kmph)	Extensive damage to kutcha houses. Some damage to old buildings. Large-scale disruption of power and communication lines. Disruption of rail and road traffic due to extensive flooding. Potential threat from flying debris	Total suspension of fishing operations. Extensive evacuation from coastal areas. Diversion or suspension of rail and road traffic. People in affected areas to remain indoors
Super Cyclone (120 kts or more, or 222 kmph or more)	Extensive structural damage to residential and industrial buildings. Total disruption of communication and power supply. Extensive damage to bridges causing large-scale disruption of rail and road traffic. Large-scale flooding and inundation of sea water. Air full of flying debris	Total suspension of fishing operations. Large-scale evacuation of coastal population. Total suspension of rail and road traffic in vulnerable areas. People in the affected areas to remain indoors

*Reference/Source: Forecasters Guide, India Meteorological Department, 2008*

Table3: **Damage expected & actions from low pressure area to super cyclonic storm**


- Collection of all types of information on individual cyclonic storms from State Governments, cyclone warning centres and other agencies.
- Continued research on storm surge, track and intensity prediction techniques.

### Area Cyclone Warning Centres (ACWCs)/ Cyclone Warning Centres (CWCs)

With the establishment of additional centres at Bhubaneswar and Visakhapatnam, the Storm Warning Centres at Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai were named as Area Cyclone Warning Centres (ACWC) and the Storm Warning Centres at Visakhapatnam, Bhubaneswar and Ahmedabad as Cyclone Warning Centres (CWC). CWCs Visakhapatnam, Bhubaneswar and Ahmedabad function under the control of the ACWCs – Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbai respectively.

Meteorological Centre (MC), Hyderabad, liaises between CWC Visakhapatnam and Andhra Pradesh government officials; warnings issued by CWC Visakhapatnam are sent to MC Hyderabad also for briefing the Andhra Pradesh government officials at the state capital.

The present organizational structure for cyclone warnings is a three-tier one, with the ACWCs/CWCs actually performing the operational work of issuing the bulletins and warnings to the various user interests, while the Cyclone Warnings (Directorate) New Delhi and the Deputy Director General of Meteorology (Weather Forecasting), through Weather Central, Pune, coordinate and guide the work of the ACWCs/CWCs, exercise supervision over their work and take necessary measures for continued improvement and efficiency of the storm warning systems of the country as a whole. The ultimate responsibility of carrying on storm warning work, however, rests with the ACWCs and



CWCs. The ACWCs/CWCs maintain round-the-clock watch.

### **Bulletins and Warnings Issued by ACWCs and CWCs**

The following is the list of bulletins and warnings issued by the ACWCs and CWCs for their respective areas of responsibility:

- Weather and sea bulletins
  - for shipping on the high seas and (issued by ACWCs Mumbai and Kolkata only)
  - for ships plying in coastal waters
- Bulletins for Indian Navy (issued by ACWCs Mumbai and Kolkata only)
- Bulletins for departmental exchanges (issued by ACWCs Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai)
- Port warnings
- Fisheries warnings
- Pre-cyclone watch and post landfall outlook (issued by Cyclone Warning Division)
- Bulletins for the AIR
- CWDS bulletins
- Warnings for registered/designated users
- Bulletins for the press
- Aviation warnings (issued by concerned aviation meteorological offices)



### **4.5 EWS Framework for Floods**

Floods are triggered by heavy rainfall and due to systems such as the cyclone. In some cases, the event can manifest quickly as in flash floods, and in some cases, it can last for days to manifest itself as in very large basins. The fact that most floods are preceded by heavy rainfall, which leads to increasing runoff in the basin and subsequent rise in the level of rivers, the phenomenon allows for EWS to be designed and operated. In addition, if there is a reservoir located upstream, the rule book can incorporate EWS into the operational procedure of the reservoir (flood control).

The EWS for floods can be positioned as a centralized system (managed by agencies like the Central Water Commission) or can be decentralized in the case of a particular city or community-operated EWS.

#### **Flood Forecasting and Warning Organization**

In the year 1958, CWC commenced the flood forecasting service in a small way by establishing flood forecasting unit for issuing water level forecasts of the Yamuna for the National Capital, Delhi. On the recommendation of various committees/panels, a Flood Forecast and Warning Organization was set up in CWC in 1969 to establish forecasting sites on inter-state rivers at various flood prone places in the country. The National Flood Forecasting and Warning Network of Central Water Commission, comprises 175 flood forecasting sites, including 28 inflow forecasting sites in flood season (Figure 9).

Central Water Commission, through its 20 flood forecasting divisions, issues forecasts to the various

user agencies, which include civil/engineering agencies of the State/Central Governments such as irrigation/revenue/railways/public undertakings and Dam/Barrage Authorities/District Magistrates/Sub-divisional Officers besides the Defence Authorities involved in the flood loss mitigation work. During the flood season, the Honourable Minister of Water Resources, Government of India, the Chairman and the Member (River Management) of Central Water Commission are apprised of the latest flood situations in the above river basins in the country.

#### **Classification of Various Flood Situations**

The Central Water Commission has categorized various flood situations for monitoring the floods in the country through its flood forecasting network, into the following four categories, depending upon the severity of floods, based on flood magnitudes.

##### **Level Forecast**

- **LOW FLOOD:** The river is said to be in LOW FLOOD situation at any flood forecasting site when the water level of the river touches or crosses the warning level, but remains below the danger level of the forecasting site.
- **MODERATE FLOOD:** If the water level of the river touches or crosses its danger level, but remains 0.50 m below the highest flood level of the site (commonly known as HFL) then the flood situation is called the MODERATE FLOOD situation.
- **HIGH FLOOD:** If the water level of the river at the forecasting site is below the highest flood level of the forecasting site but is still within 0.50 m of the HFL, then the flood situation is called HIGH FLOOD situation. In this situation, a special Orange Bulletin is issued by the Central Water Commission to the user agencies, which contains the 'special flood message' related to the high flood.
- **UNPRECEDENTED FLOOD:** The flood situation

is said to be UNPRECEDENTED when the water level of the river crosses the HFL recorded at the forecasting site so far. In this situation, a special Red Bulletin is issued by the Central Water Commission to the user agencies, which contains the 'special flood message' related to the unprecedented flood.

### Inflow Forecast

- Inflow forecasts are issued for 28 dams/reservoirs/barrages in various river basins in the country. The project authorities have identified the threshold inflow limits for issue of forecast considering various factors such as safety of the dam, status of the reservoir, downstream channel/canal requirements.

### Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Flood Forecasting and Warning

The basic activity of data collection, its transmission and dissemination of flood forecasts to the local administration is carried out by the field divisions of CWC. The modelling centres and Divisional Flood Control Rooms (DFCR) are located in the premises of the field divisions. The field divisions perform these activities as per the existing Manual on Flood Forecasting, which contains the following critical activities as the general SOPs:

1. Nomination of Nodal Officers of CWC for interaction with the Nodal Officers of the concerned State Governments before monsoon every year
2. Gearing up of flood forecasting network before monsoon every year
3. Operation of Divisional Flood Control Room during monsoon every year
4. Operation of Central Flood Control Room (CFCR) during monsoon every year




Figure 9: **Flood forecasting stations in India**

Source: [http://india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/wrpinfo/index.php?title=CWC\\_National\\_Flood\\_Forecasting\\_Network](http://india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/wrpinfo/index.php?title=CWC_National_Flood_Forecasting_Network). Last accessed on 19 April 2014

5. Issue of flood forecasts to designated officer of the concerned state and transmission thereof through FAX/telephone/email/through special messengers during monsoon every year

6. Sending flood alerts through SMS on mobile phones to the concerned officers of State/Central Government during high and unprecedented flood situations as per Standard Operating procedure (SOP) for issuing alerts and electronic messaging in the event of disaster situations issued by National Disaster Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, vide letter No: 31-32/2003-NDM-III/II dated 10 April 2006, made effective from 24 April 2006.

For the purpose of dissemination of alerts to PMO/ Cabinet Secretariat, a uniform system has been devised by categorizing each type of alert in stages – Yellow, Orange and Red.



#### 4.6 EWS Framework for Heat Wave Condition

Heat wave conditions develop over major parts of the country during the mid-season, which often persist until the monsoon advances over the region. Heat wave need not be considered till the maximum temperature of a station reaches at least 40 °C for plains and at least 30 °C for hilly regions. The specifications for declaring the heat/cold wave conditions have been revised three times by IMD so far, viz., in 1978, 1989 and last in 2002. The revised criteria are prevalent with effect from 1 March 2002, along with some additional circulars on comfort index-based temperature forecast, description of 24-hour temperature tendency etc. When the actual maximum temperature remains

45 °C or more, irrespective of normal maximum temperature, heat wave should be declared.

**Hot Day** – In the northern plains of the country, dust in suspension occurs for several days, bringing the minimum temperature much higher than normal and keeping the maximum temperature around or slightly above normal. Sometimes, increase in humidity also adds to this discomfort. Nights do not get cool and become uncomfortable. To cover this situation, hot day concept has been introduced. Whenever the maximum temperature remains 40°C or more and minimum temperature is 5°C or more above normal, it may be defined as Hot Day, provided it does not satisfy the heat wave criteria given above. Criteria for describing Hot Day for coastal stations are different. When the maximum temperature departure is 5°C or more from normal, Hot Day may be described irrespective of the threshold value of 40°C. If the threshold value of 40°C is reached, Heat Wave may be declared. When a station satisfies both the Heat Wave and Hot Day criteria, then Heat Wave should be given higher priority and be declared.

**Hot Wind** – Hot wind reduces moisture causing dehydration, and prolonged exposure may prove to be fatal. The phenomenon of Loo (heat wave) over the plains of northwest India is very well-known. It is also described in the weather bulletins and appropriate warnings are issued.

**Comfort Index** – As per the recommendation of Annual Monsoon Review Meeting, 2004 (Kolkata, January 2004), it has been decided to replace the mere descriptions of maximum and minimum temperatures in weather reports and daily weather summaries by suitable comfort index, based on temperature and humidity as described below with reference to issuance of local forecast at

forecasting centres. The recommendations cited are as follows:

1. Present procedure of issuing local forecast for meteorological parameters, including heat and cold waves, is to continue.

2. In addition to the above forecast, supplementary forecast based on human discomfort utilizing the Heat Index (HI) may be introduced on a trial basis for one year.

3. The HI is to be calculated based on the forecast of maximum temperature and that of relative humidity. Suggested criteria and terminology for issuing human discomfort information are given below. For day time, the criteria will be considered only when the departure of maximum temperature is above 2°C.

4. Regarding discomfort due to low temperatures during winter season, the present criteria using the wind chill index may continue.

5. The use of issuing discomfort forecast will be reviewed after one year based on the feedback from users.



Temp.	Relative Humidity (%)												
	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100
<b>110 (43)</b>	136 (58)												
<b>108 (42)</b>	130 (54)	137 (58)											
<b>106 (41)</b>	124 (51)	130 (54)	137 (58)										
<b>104 (40)</b>	119 (48)	124 (51)	134 (55)	137 (58)									
<b>102 (39)</b>	114 (46)	119 (48)	124 (51)	130 (54)	137 (58)								
<b>100 (38)</b>	109 (43)	114 (46)	118 (48)	124 (51)	129 (54)	136 (58)							
<b>98 (37)</b>	105 (41)	109 (43)	113 (45)	117 (47)	123 (51)	128 (53)	134 (57)						
<b>96 (36)</b>	101 (38)	104 (40)	108 (42)	112 (44)	116 (47)	121 (49)	126 (52)	132 (56)					
<b>94 (34)</b>	97 (36)	100 (38)	103 (39)	106 (41)	110 (43)	114 (46)	119 (48)	124 (51)	129 (54)	136 (58)			
<b>92 (33)</b>	94 (34)	96 (36)	99 (37)	101 (38)	106 (41)	108 (42)	112 (44)	116 (47)	121 (49)	126 (52)	131 (55)		
<b>90 (32)</b>	91 (33)	93 (34)	95 (35)	97 (36)	100 (38)	103 (39)	106 (41)	109 (43)	113 (45)	117 (47)	122 (50)	127 (53)	132 (56)
<b>88 (31)</b>	88 (31)	89 (32)	91 (33)	93 (34)	95 (35)	98 (37)	100 (38)	103 (39)	106 (41)	110 (43)	113 (45)	117 (47)	121 (49)
<b>86 (30)</b>	86 (29)	87 (31)	88 (31)	89 (32)	91 (33)	93 (34)	95 (35)	97 (36)	100 (38)	102 (39)	106 (41)	108 (42)	112 (44)
<b>84 (29)</b>	83 (28)	84 (29)	85 (29)	86 (30)	88 (31)	89 (32)	90 (32)	92 (33)	94 (34)	96 (36)	98 (37)	100 (38)	103 (39)
<b>82 (28)</b>	81 (27)	82 (28)	83 (28)	84 (29)	84 (29)	86 (29)	86 (30)	88 (31)	89 (32)	90 (32)	91 (33)	93 (34)	95 (35)
<b>80 (27)</b>	80 (27)	80 (27)	81 (27)	81 (27)	82 (28)	82 (28)	83 (28)	84 (29)	84 (29)	85 (29)	86 (30)	86 (30)	87 (31)

● Uncomfortable hot day/night     
 ● Uncomfortable sultry day/night     
 ● Highly uncomfortable day/night     
 ● Highly uncomfortable sultry day/night

**Figure 10: Heat Index °F (°C)**

Source: Forecasting Guide, IMD (2008)

Category	Heat Index	Possible Heat disorders for people in high risk groups
Extreme Danger	130°F (54°C) or higher	Heat stroke or sunstroke likely
Danger	105-129°F 41-54°C	Sunstroke, muscle cramps and/or heat exhaustion likely. Heat-stroke possible with prolonged exposure and/or physical activity
Extreme Caution	90-105°F 32-41°C	Sunstroke, muscle cramps and/or heat exhaustion possible with prolonged exposure and/or physical activity
Caution	80-90°F 27-32°C	Fatigue possible with prolonged exposure and/or physical activity



#### 4.7 EWS Framework for Public Health Risks

Integrated Disease Surveillance Project (IDSP) was launched in November 2004 to detect and respond to disease outbreaks quickly. The programme continues in the 12th Plan under NRHM.

Surveillance units have been established in all states/districts (SSU/DSU). Central Surveillance Unit (CSU) has been established and integrated with the National Centre for Disease Control, Delhi.

Training of state/district surveillance teams and Rapid Response Teams (RRT) has been completed for all 35 states/UTs.

IT network connecting 776 sites in States/District HQ and premier institutes has been established with the help of National Informatics Centre (NIC) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for data entry, training, video conferencing and outbreak discussion.

Under the project, weekly disease surveillance data on epidemic prone disease are being collected from reporting units such as sub-centres, primary health centres, community health centres, hospitals, including government and private sector hospitals, and medical colleges. The data are being collected on 'S' syndromic, 'P' probable and 'L' laboratory formats using standard case definitions. Presently, more than 90 per cent districts report such weekly data through email/portal ([www.idsp.nic.in](http://www.idsp.nic.in)). The weekly data are analysed by SSU/DSU for disease trends. Whenever there is rising trend of illnesses, it is investigated by the RRT to diagnose and control the outbreak.

States/districts have been asked to notify the outbreaks immediately to the system. On an average, 30 to 40 outbreaks are reported every week by the states. About 553 outbreaks were reported and responded to by the states in 2008, 799 outbreaks in 2009, 990 in 2010, 1675 outbreaks in 2011, 1584 outbreaks in 2012, 1964 outbreaks in 2013 and 67 outbreaks in 2014 have been reported till 26 January 2014.


Media scanning and verification cell was established under IDSP in July 2008. It detects and shares media alerts with the concerned states/districts for verification and response. A total of 2595 media alerts were reported from July 2008 to January 2014. Majority of alerts were related to diarrhoeal diseases, food poisoning and vector-borne diseases.

A 24X7 call centre was established in February 2008 to receive disease alerts on a toll free telephone number (1075). The information received is provided to the states/districts surveillance units for investigation and response. The call centre was extensively used during H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009 and dengue outbreak in Delhi in 2010. About 2,77,395 lakh calls have been received from the beginning till 30 June 2012, out of which 35,866 calls were related to influenza A H1N1. From November 2012, a total of 57,855 calls were received till January 2014, out of which 1605 calls were related to H1N1.

About 50 district laboratories are being identified and strengthened for diagnosis of epidemic-prone diseases. These labs are being supported by a contractual microbiologist to manage the laboratory. About 29 states (42 labs) have completed the procurement. In addition, a network

of 12 laboratories has been developed for influenza surveillance in the country. In nine states, a referral lab network has been established by utilizing the existing 65 functional labs in medical colleges and various other major centres in the states and linking them with adjoining districts for providing diagnostic services for epidemic-prone diseases during outbreaks. Based on the experience gained, the plan will be implemented in the remaining 26 states/UTs. A total of 23 medical college labs, identified in Bihar, Assam, Odisha, Tripura, Kerala, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir and Manipur, have been added to the network during 2012–13 to provide support in the adjoining districts.

Considering the non-availability of health professionals in the field of epidemiology, microbiology and entomology at district and state levels, MOHFW has approved the recruitment of trained professionals under NRHM to strengthen the disease surveillance and response system by placing one epidemiologist each at state/district headquarters, and one microbiologist and entomologist each at the state headquarters.



**Notes:**

City	Shimla
District	Shimla
Area	19.99 Sq. Km.
Height from Sea Level	2397.59 Mtrs.
Population	0.169 Million (as per 2011 census)
No. of Wards	25

**Key Hazard:**  
 Earthquake, Landslide, Land Sinking  
 Hailstorm, Severe Storms, including lightning & high winds (Thunderstorms)  
 Flash Flood/cloud Burst  
 Heavy Snow Falls

**Sources:**  
 Census of India, 2011  
 Shimla Municipal Corporation, 2014  
 GeoEye Imagery; Google Earth Pro 2014.

**Legend**  
 - - - - - City Boundary

Figure12: Satellite Image and basic information: Shimla

## 5. REVIEW OF EWS IN SHIMLA



### 5.1 GENERAL CITY INFORMATION

Shimla city is the capital of Himachal Pradesh and lies in the north-western ranges of the Himalayas. It is located at 31.61°N 77.10°E with an average altitude of 2398 m above mean sea level. The city is spread on a ridge and its seven spurs. The city stretches nearly 9.2 km from east to west.

Shimla city population stands at 169,758 (census 2011); its urban agglomeration population is 171,817 of which 94,797 are males and 77,020 are females. A vast majority of the area occupied by the present-day Shimla city was dense forest during the 18th century. The city was originally designed for a population of 25,000, but today more than 171,000 are residents of the city and the floating population is over 100,000 (especially tourists). The population growth and demand for housing and infrastructure have resulted in rapid and unplanned urbanization of the city.



### 5.2 BACKGROUND ON HAZARD RISK

#### Geophysical Hazard

Shimla and its surrounding region are bounded by two major thrusts, the Main Central Thrust (MCT) and Main Boundary Fault (MBF). Other thrusts in the region which include Jwalamukhi Thrust and the Drag Thrust, result in several other lineaments piercing the zone into fractured and faulted blocks and active faults, enhancing the structural discontinuities. The city of Shimla falls in Zone IV (High Damage Risk Zone) as per the seismic hazard zoning map of India. The region has

experienced frequent mild tremors and periodic major earthquakes, and this will continue to do so in the future due to its unique tectonic setting. Weak construction techniques and increasing population pose a serious threat to the already earthquake prone region.

Earthquake induced ground failure can be expected along the northern slopes of the ridge, i.e., in Lakkar Bazaar, New Shimla and Vikas Nagar, Ruldu Bhatta, Phingask, Kachhi Ghhati (soft valley), and along the drainage channels. Northern slopes (Snowdown Hospital Area) of the Ridge have already experienced subsidence since 1971 and are still considered as 'sinking zone' extending from Scandal Point to Lakkar Bazaar, including the Old City Bus Stand, Idgah, Longwood, Ruldu Bhatta and adjoining areas. Soft soil depth is about 10 m at some places in New Shimla, which may also lead to subsidence in the face of an earthquake (Anshu Sharma, Reducing Urban Risk through Community-Based Approaches in Shimla; CDMP Shimla 2012).

Another rising concern is the frequent number of landslides that often take place after heavy rains. The other reasons for these slides are faulty building construction practices along these slopes. The city is prone to frequent landslides with majority of the events taking place during the monsoons. Rainfall triggers instability of the slopes, especially after a heavy downpour, resulting in landslide events.

#### Hydro-Meteorological Hazard

Reports mention that severe storms, lightning and severe winds have in the past caused damage to the city and its infrastructure. The frequent risk includes falling of trees and subsequent blocking of the road network and tripping of electricity and communication networks.

Shimla region also experiences cloudbursts and is prone to flash flood like events. These extreme short-lived events cause severe downpour and wash away all obstacles in the path resulting in loss of lives and severe damage to property.

Snowfall usually occurs between December and February. The CDMP 2012 highlights the Snow Manual, which was prepared for Shimla town and its suburban areas. The objective of this manual is to keep concerned departments in readiness for the snow season, to take such steps as are necessary to prevent damage and loss to human life and property, and to ensure that normal life is restored without any loss of time.

#### Public Health Risks

Rapid urbanization, industrialization, developmental activities, ecological changes as well as international travel have increased the risk of transmission of diseases. Similarly, changes in lifestyle are accompanied by increased risk of certain non-communicable diseases. Alternatively, inadequate drinking water facilities and poor sanitary conditions pose risk of communicable diseases.

The residents of Shimla are affected by frequent water-borne disease (e.g. jaundice) outbreaks. These outbreaks may be a result of sewage mixing with potable water or contamination of natural water sources. IT also reports cases of acute diarrhoeal disease (cholera), scrub typhus, enteric fever, fever of unknown origin, acute respiratory infection, bacillary dysentery and measles.

The Health Department of SMC and the IDSP Cell undertake IEC activities in regard to safe drinking water, hygienic practices and sanitation measures.



### 5.3 BRIEF VULNERABILITY PROFILE

Rapid population growth during the last three decades has created a huge pressure on the land due to increased demand for residential housing, commercial activities and urban services. This, combined with poor planning, has resulted in construction of buildings over unstable slopes with little attention to basic safety.

The built environment is very congested and dense, combined with narrow streets and staircases. A large number of the building stock is not accessible by motorable roads. These roads are susceptible to blockages due to landslides (also triggered by heavy rain) or building collapse in the event of an earthquake.

During the peak tourist season, close to 3000 tourist vehicles occupy the roads and cause immense traffic congestion. Lack of open spaces and parking spaces is a major concern in the city. In addition, key lifeline infrastructure of the city, located in zones of high risk, may become inaccessible in case of moderate to high category hazard risk events.



### 5.4 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The CDMP (2012) outlines the emergency response system for various hazard events and outlines the roles and responsibilities based on the Incident Response System framework as established by NDMA. IRS for Shimla identifies 40 IRS positions

and respective officer to man every IRS.

City Emergency Operation Centre is in close proximity to the SMC. In case of an event or a disaster situation, the EOC will serve as a command and control centre of all response activities. Commissioner SMC will assume the role of Incident Commander and activate the command as outlined in the IRS section of the CDMP. About 14 emergency support functions have been identified to cater to response actions in the city. The plan also outlines the role and responsibilities of the primary and secondary agencies.

Select agencies are involved in the process of issuing early warning and coordinating response before and during the events at the city level. Their roles and current functioning based on the available plans and conducted interviews are described below.

#### **Meteorological Centre Shimla**

Branch Meteorological Office was set up in Shimla around 1875 and from 1885 onwards, the Indian Daily Weather Report, monthly and seasonal summaries, and long-range forecasts were issued by IMD from Shimla. Meteorological Centre Shimla was established in 2002 by the Government of India, India Meteorological Department (IMD), MoES for providing the meteorological services to Himachal Pradesh. The Meteorological Centre issues weather forecast and severe weather warnings.

Meteorological Centre, Shimla, provides non-aviation weather forecast and adverse weather warnings to the different state authorities/organizations of Himachal Pradesh. The centre is planning to initiate aviation weather information/forecast very shortly. The centre also provides

agriculture meteorological advisory services for the farmers, seismological services, city weather forecast, tourist forecast, adventure forecast and highway forecast for the state.

The meteorological centre's tasks involve collection of weather data from different observatories in Himachal Pradesh, computation and analysis of surface data, supervision of the work of regular/part-time observatories situated within the state, monitoring of the data records and strengthening the of meteorological network in Himachal Pradesh. In addition, the centre also responds to the weather-related queries of the state authorities in times of their need.

The centre provides seven day weather forecasts for the city and district-wise agriculture recommendations for the farmers of HP (twice in a week). This information is sent to Commissioners of Relief and other Disaster Management Authorities, District Collectors, Department of Agriculture, Horticulture, Department of Irrigation, Dam Authorities, Railways, Roads and Media. The centre also provides special services to Dam Authorities (BBMB and Ranjit Sagar Dam) and transport (BRO, Beacon, Deepak) departments

The Meteorological Centre of Shimla monitors weather parameters for which forecasts and warnings are issued. This includes rainfall/snowfall, heat wave/cold wave or events such as hailstorm/thunderstorm and squall. The outreach of forecast is done using SMS. The state through its nodal departments is currently in the process of establishing redundant linkage for sharing real time and online information.

The station at Shimla is equipped with Digital Met Data Dissemination (DMDD) High Speed Data

Terminal (HSDT) and a 256 kbps data circuit for transmission and reception of meteorological data, Interactive Voice Responsive System (IVRS) etc. The Meteorological Office in Shimla has installed the following instruments: thermometers, barometer, rain gauge, thermograph, hair hydrograph, SRRG, Automatic Weather Station (AWS) and Automatic Rain Gauge Station (ARG).

### **Department of Industries**

Department of Industries (Geological Wing) is the nodal agency in the state for mapping landslide risk prone areas and investigating landslide hazard events. The Department of Industries supports the revenue and other departments in the state for investigating post-event situations. Broad risk identification of 'landslide potential areas' and 'sinking zones' in Shimla city has been identified by the department.

In addition, Geological Survey of India and National Remote Sensing Centre are involved in mapping landslide hazard in the state (select hotspot monitoring).

### **Geological Survey of India (Chandigarh Office)**

Geological Survey of India office at Chandigarh is responsible for coordinating and understanding geological studies for landslide hazard mitigation and for carrying out landslide hazard zonation, monitoring landslides and avalanches and studying the factors responsible for sliding and suggesting precautionary and preventive measures.

### **Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP), Department of Health and Family Welfare**

Integrated Disease Surveillance Project (IDSP) aims at improving the efficiency of disease surveillance for use in health planning, management and

evaluating control strategies. It is intended to detect early warning signals of impending outbreaks and help initiate an effective response in a timely manner. Himachal Pradesh was the first state in the country to launch IDSP. In Himachal Pradesh, the programme is implemented under the National Rural Health Mission, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Himachal Pradesh.

Diseases in the list of regular surveillance include:

- Vector-borne diseases: malaria (other vector-borne diseases under this group), dengue, JE, leishmaniasis, chikunguniya etc.
- Water-borne disease: acute diarrhoeal disease (cholera)
- Respiratory diseases: typhoid, tuberculosis
- Vaccine preventable diseases: measles
- Diseases under eradication: polio
- Other conditions: road traffic accidents (link to police computers)
- Other international commitments plague
- Unusual clinical syndromes: meningoencephalitis/respiratory distress, hemorrhagic fevers and other undiagnosed conditions.

Diseases under sentinel surveillance include:

- Sexually transmitted diseases/blood-borne: HIV/ HBV, HCV
- Other conditions: water quality, outdoor air quality (large urban centres)

City specific diseases include:

- Scrub typhus
- Thyroid deficiency disorders
- Cancer
- Rheumatic heart disease
- Cutaneous leishmaniasis

The function of District Surveillance Unit is the collation and analysis of data received from all

reporting units and transmitting to State Surveillance Unit (SSU) and SSU transmitting it to Central Surveillance Unit. In addition, DSU constitutes rapid response team (RRT), which is deputed to the field, wherever needed. to implements/monitors all project activities.

IDSP coordinates with public health laboratories, medical college, NGOs, private sectors, and sends regular feedback to the reporting units on analysis of data. DSU would organize training and meetings of DSC within the districts. The reporting units, medical colleges and the district hospital are part of the functioning levels for implementation of IDSP.

Outbreaks caused due to poor sanitation services or mixing of sewage with water supply are handled by the Health Department of SMC (Municipal Health Officer is the nodal officer for Shimla city). Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, collaborates with Directorate Health services for the IDSP project. The samples collected by the State Surveillance Unit are sent for laboratory test at IGMC and other laboratories based on case basis. Investigation by the State RRT and the District RRT has been effective and outbreaks are identified/confirmed much before media publish the news.

IDSP Cell at Shimla has a strong collaboration with the media. Information on prevention and care during outbreak is announced through cable television, FM channels, All India Radio (prime time) and through distribution of vernacular IEC materials.

### **Central Water Commission (CWC), Directorate at Shimla**

Central Water Commission (CWC) provides flood forecasting and warning. The flood forecasting

network of the CWC covers all the major flood-prone inter-state river basins in the country. Flood forecasting and warning system are used for alerting of likely damage and enable people to move and also remove their moveable property to safer places.

In the state of Himachal Pradesh, the CWC has set up a Directorate at Shimla for monitoring of floods. CWC has established flood forecasting network in the Satluj basin at Titang, Powari, Nathpa, Rampur and Pandoh. CWC has also established two telemetry-based automatic gauge stations along the Parechu River. The Directorate at Shimla is also engaged in snow hydrological studies and, with the help of NRSC, Hyderabad, is forecasting snowmelt run off in Satluj, Yamuna, Beas and Chenab basins in the state. Daily gauge and discharge data are collected manually and, from two telemetric locations along Parechu River, are transmitted to Shimla station through VSAT arrangement. This information is further disseminated by email/fax during flood season.

#### **Himachal Pradesh State Disaster Management Authority, Department of Revenue (Disaster Management Cell), Government of Himachal Pradesh**

The Himachal Pradesh State Disaster Management Authority (HPSMDA) has streamlined plan preparation for disaster management at the state, district and at select cities across the state. HPSMDA have issued guidelines to all the departments for undertaking capacity building, training, preparation, department-specific disaster management plans etc. Guidelines for on-site and off-site emergency plans for factories have been issued. State-wide hazard vulnerability and risk assessment study have been commissioned.

The state policy on DM has also been issued. The authority is in the process of establishing the State level Emergency Operation Centre (to be located within HP Secretariat). This EOC will strengthen the existing control room and will be the nerve centre for coordination and management of disasters. For information flow, besides its own toll free number, 1070, the SEOC is also connected to the existing network of emergency 108, Police and Fire. The SEOC has direct connection with NEOC and early warning networks of all nodal agencies at the national and state levels. The SEOC acts as a centralized coordination unit to provide direction on receipt of early warning or on occurrence of event.

## 5.5 INDICATORS OF THE EXISTING CONDITION OF EWS

Table 4: **Criteria development matrix: Indicators of existing condition of EWS in Shimla**

S. NO.	COMPONENT 1	EWS GOVERNANCE - CITY LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK					REMARKS
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					
		1	2	3	4	5	
1.1	State legislation for EWS framework includes local authority (urban local body) as an integral part (document, control ULB)	●	○	○	○	○	The State Disaster Management (DM) Plan has no mention of role/mandate for Shimla Municipal Corporation as a part of the EWS framework. This constrains the development of EWS at the city level. The legal status of EWS establishment at the city level is unclear
1.2	Institutional mechanism for local authority (ULB) is an integral part of EWS framework (document, mandate, implementation)	●	○	○	○	○	The Shimla City DM Plan has mention of EWS; however, it does not indicate any institutional mechanism and the role of Shimla Municipal Corporation (SMC) as part of the EWS framework
1.3	ULB accorded with the authority to disseminate warnings (mandate, SOP, implementation)	●	●	●	○	○	Dissemination of warnings is done by SMC Health Department to the city via local newspaper. No SOP is currently in place
1.4	Extent of preparedness and prevention actions evident among state technical and disaster management agencies (relevant department DM Plan at state, SOPs, link from state to city)	●	●	○	○	○	DM plans exist but are partially implemented. Preparedness actions are evident for earthquake hazard and public health risks



S. NO.	COMPONENT 2	USER NEEDS					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
2.1	Hotspots identified for potential hazard impact (identified, mapped and updated)	●	●	○	○	○	Institutional memory of hotspots exists based on historical events. This is evident for landslide prone areas, snowfall and public health risks (areas with poor access to water and sanitation services). The hotspots are not clearly demarcated
2.2	Outreach practice (dissemination of warning)	●	●	●	○	○	Forecast exists for weather events, warning exists for all key hazards (excluding earthquake and landslide), and information is provided by IMD and health department to government institutions and media. There is lack of integration of existing warning systems with arrangements for service providers (transport, education, electricity, water supply etc.)
2.3	Timely dissemination of warnings to vulnerable groups (residing in slums, high risk prone areas)	●	●	○	○	○	Warning of disease outbreak is provided to slums through IDSP. No clear mechanism exists for warning of other hazards
2.4	Arrangement for night time warning (limited to floods, landslides, cyclones, tsunamis)	●	○	○	○	○	Arrangements for night time warning do not exist and the need is yet to be realized
2.5	Media engagement in dissemination of warning	●	●	●	○	○	Media engagement with the forecasting agencies is evident specifically at the Meteorological Centre, Shimla. Media engagement in prevention of health risks is evident through engagement with the state department health agencies
2.6	Content of warning to general public by local government (ULB) (graphic representation and behavioural content for taking actions at individual/household and community levels)	●	○	○	○	○	No formal mechanism for dissemination of warning to citizens and tourists exists

S. NO.	COMPONENT 3	OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
<b>TECHNICAL AGENCIES</b>							
3.1	Risk assessment and integration with potential impact assessment (identification, mapping, integration)	●	●	○	○	○	City level risk assessment has not been undertaken, qualitative ward level hazard indication is provided within the City DM Plan
3.2.1	Warning mechanism for geophysical hazards (earthquake)	●	○	○	○	○	The city of Shimla does not have geophysical early warning/alert system
3.2.2	Warning mechanism for hydro-meteorological hazards (cyclone, severe winds, heat wave, cold wave, extreme rainfall, fluvial flooding, pluvial flooding)	●	●	○	○	○	Warning related to snow and extreme rainfall is currently being provided by IMD with inadequate respite time. No warning mechanisms currently exist for heat wave, cold wave, pluvial flooding
3.2.3	Advisory mechanism for public health risks (vector-borne and water-borne diseases)	●	●	●	●	○	Demarcation of areas based on active and passive surveillance is currently done under IDSP. There was no evidence of involvement of private stakeholders. Advisories are provided upon the realization of disease outbreak
3.3.1	Availability of technology to nowcast/forecast geophysical hazards by technical agencies	●	○	○	○	○	The city is highly prone to earthquake and landslide, but there is currently no mechanism to monitor and arrive at thresholds for landslide events within the city limits. There is high dependency on national agencies for observing, monitoring and forecasting
3.3.2	Availability of technology in nowcast/forecast of hydro-meteorological hazards by technical agencies	●	●	●	○	○	Technology to forecast and nowcast is being implemented by IMD
3.3.3	Disease surveillance system (surveillance coverage, collection method, analysis)	●	●	●	○	○	Health surveillance at district level is being carried out by IDSP, and at city level is being carried out by Health Department, Shimla Municipal Corporation. Information is collected on paper-based forms. Technology to address city-specific needs is currently limited
3.4	Uncertainty in forecast and warning (hydro-met, public health)	●	○	○	○	○	For hydro-meteorological hazards forecast is provided by IMD to select government institutions and media. Warning based on forecast requires improvement. There exists no forecast or warning mechanism for geophysical hazards. For public health, the health department has no forecast mechanism, but provides warning upon realization of the outbreak

S. NO.	COMPONENT 3	OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EWS					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
<b>DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCY / LOCAL AUTHORITY (ULB)</b>							
3.5	Budget allocation by the local authority for EWS	●	●	○	○	○	Budget head does not exist and currently, the expenses towards disaster preparedness/EWS are being made from miscellaneous heads. There is no evidence of realization of the need for having a separate budget for EWS
3.6	Data availability for operations of EWS	●	●	○	○	○	Council of Science and Technology has made attempts to collate data. ULB is currently not involved in the process
3.7	Staffing and capacity within local authority for operation and maintenance of EWS	●	●	●	○	○	Currently, the local authority provides only health advisories. Realization of need for dedicated staff for EWS is not evident
3.8	Use of modern technology to disseminate warning (hydro-met, public health)	●	●	○	○	○	There are two sirens which are currently operational. One is located at EOC and other at IMD. There is a plan for installation of digital displays. Modern technology are being used for providing hydro-met warning. Health advisories are generally provided to public at large through local newspapers and television. Use of modern technology for disseminating warning does not exist for geophysical hazards
3.9	Redundancy (multi-mode) in communication networks	●	●	○	○	○	Recognition of need is evident within technical institutions and state authorities only
3.10	City Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) for housing data of hazard, vulnerability and risk	●	●	○	○	○	The state EOC (SEOC) is located within the city. The SEOC is realized to function for the state and the city. Due to the presence of SEOC, there is no realization of need by the ULB or other technical institutions to establish a city EOC

S. NO.	COMPONENT 4	PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ACROSS THE WARNING CHAIN					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
4.1	Degree of local details incorporated in warnings	●	●	●	○	○	City level macro details are included for hydro-meteorological hazards (limited to rainfall and snow)
4.2	Raising awareness about warnings at city level	●	●	○	○	○	Efforts are being made to raise public awareness on frequent hazards. Awareness programmes are currently conducted by HPSDMA/DM Cell (State), UNDP and IDSP
4.3	Ability of technical agencies and disaster management institutions to cater their early warning products and services to user-specific requirements	●	○	○	○	○	User need assessment has not been undertaken. But there is a realization for need for specific products by various departments, especially for the geophysical, hydro-met and public health risks
4.4	Risk communication	●	○	○	○	○	Risk assessment is not undertaken at the city level. The key stakeholders, based on their previous experience, do tend to translate the hazard information to possible risk (including vulnerability) information to take action

S. NO.	COMPONENT 5	COORDINATION MECHANISM					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
5.1	Extent of coordination between technical agencies and disaster management agencies	●	●	○	○	○	Due to absence of city disaster management cell and functional city EOC, the state–district–city level agencies communicate on need basis. A well-coordinated mechanism to stage actions on receiving warning is not evident
5.2	Extent of links between disaster management agencies and service providers	●	●	○	○	○	No formal links between agencies is evident. Select service providers are informed during the onset of an event
5.3	Extent of links between media and disaster management agencies	●	●	●	○	○	Reflection of warning information in media products is evident (information passed by IMD to local media). Links between media and technical agencies were found to be stronger with IMD through their frequency of interaction in comparison to the SMC

S. NO.	COMPONENT 6	SERVICE DELIVERY AND FEEDBACK LOOPS					
	CRITERIA	DEVELOPMENT STAGE INDICATORS					REMARKS
		1	2	3	4	5	
6.1	The knowledge of user community of early warning system and its effectiveness	●	●	○	○	○	ULB and service providers are aware of the extreme rainfall/snow warning (IMD vs. District Collectorate, Municipal Corporation Officials) and health risks (IDSP vs. Health Department of SMC), but few evidence of coordinated actions was evident
6.2	Extent to which the warning mechanism allows for feedback from the affected area	●	●	●	○	○	Limited feedback mechanism exists and it does not include all stakeholders. Communication of warning is more unidirectional – technical agencies to disaster management agencies (state/district/city). The authority to issue warning is with the state and the districts. For geophysical and hydro-meteorological hazards, there is no evidence of confirmation and feedback mechanism. In case of public health, it is achieved through field workers providing feedback on a weekly basis.
6.3	Level of reflection and learning evident within local authority	●	○	○	○	○	Post event reflection is done. There is no evidence of increased communication and response mechanism for geophysical and hydro-meteorological hazard risks. In case of public health, the reflection and learning takes place between State IDSP Cell and the Health Department of SMC
6.4	Monitoring, evaluation and targets for improvement of EWS	●	○	○	○	○	No formal procedure to monitor the EWS is in place



## 5.6 SUMMARY

Shimla city, being the capital of Himachal Pradesh, has distinct advantage of institutional presence and resources for management of severe event (disasters) and risk reduction activities. The city has the presence of institutions catering to the needs of services in disaster management. Key institutions include: HPSDMA/DM Cell Department of Revenue, Meteorological Centre (Shimla), Geology Wing of Industries Department, Aryabhata Geoinformatics and Space Application Centre (AGiSAC), IDSP (State Surveillance Unit), and Municipal Corporation of Shimla (Urban Local Body). The city is also implementing a range of programmes on disaster risk reduction and climate risk management aspects.

The institutional framework for early warning system (severe weather warning) is limited to information received from the Meteorological Office (MO), Shimla, and the mechanism established by IDSP for disease outbreak. Given the city dynamics and limitations due to geographical location and spread, a well-established EWS for geophysical and hydro-meteorological hazards is the need of the hour. The City Disaster Management Cell of SMC rolled out the first City Disaster Management Plan in 2012 (under the GoI-UNDP Disaster Risk Reduction Programme). The document indicated the hazard profile of the city, vulnerability and risk posed to the city for various hazards, and outlines the mitigation and response plan for the city. The section of the plan also outlines the trigger mechanism for various hazards. However, discussions with key stakeholders in the city and the state department reveal that there is need for greater coordination and establishment of EWS in the city.

The overall vulnerability of Shimla to various hazards is high complex function of hazard intensity, population (densely-packed settlements, settlements in dangerous and environmentally fragile zones), exposure of assets, remoteness/accessibility, socio-economic factors, services and utilities outreach and infrastructure vulnerability (critical buildings, transport – roads and railways, communications). The city of Shimla now has a larger and more densely-packed population, coupled with terrain challenges the exposure to risk of damage caused by hazard events stands to be significant. Well-established EWS to potential hazard risks will ameliorate disaster risk management concerns of the city.

The review of key agencies brought to the forefront, the need for early warning system for all hazards. Success of any EWS will depend on the detailed understanding of city risks. In case of Shimla, qualitative risk assessment has been undertaken and key locations and hotspots are known to SMC and stakeholders. This information is, however, rudimentary and cannot be used for potential impact assessment or warning to vulnerable population in the city. Post-Uttarakhand Tragedy (June 2013) there has been a growing concern for developing early warning system and addressing the forecast needs and dissemination mechanism to the stakeholders.

At present, the only evidence of forecast is developed for weather events by the Meteorological Office (MO) in Shimla. This forecast also needs significant improvement so as to identify and track extreme events within the geographical area of the city. Lack of field studies and updating of vulnerability assessment limits the dissemination to intended users. The target for warning is purely

based on past experiences and from observed phenomenon in some cases (sinking zones, building tilts, mass wasting and debris flow). Translation of severe weather warning to potential impact is not analysed at the moment. City and state level agencies realize the need for precise local weather forecast and plan for establishment of monitoring mechanism for geophysical hazards in the city.

Health advisories and warning are currently provided by health department and IDSP upon realization of disease breakout. Technology used to monitor, nowcast and disseminate hydro-meteorological event warning and geophysical event alerts is currently limited and lacks required data/information to address city specific needs.


The current method of dissemination of extreme weather warning to all nodal agencies is through mail/fax and SMS being sent from MO, Shimla, to government departments. The information is also disseminated to general public through local media (print, radio and television). General public are unable to translate the forecast into warning or actionable points. Addressing the last mile connectivity is still an issue.

SMC has been supported by UNDP for preparation of the City DM Plan and there has been significant effort to capture the operational components for disaster management and risk reduction in the CDMP. The City EOC is located in the city. Though these developments are very recent, there is a need to further strengthen the mechanisms within the City EOC and develop a SOP for functioning of the EOC with appropriate number of trained staff on a 24x7 basis. In the absence of the functional State EOC, the strengthening of City EOC is imperative.

Due to terrain constraints and the threats of hazard, the EOC has to be established at both the state and the city levels. In the non-emergency period, the city EOC can be advised to collate data and monitor specific hazard risks such as slope instability, sinking zones and ground failure due to wrong construction practices and update the risk profile of the city. This database shall strengthen the EWS mechanism and help to establish threshold levels for hotspots and risk zones and determine potential impact for key hazards.

Evidence of warning mechanism exists only for severe weather events and for health risks. Information from the technical agencies is passed on to the disaster management agencies/response agencies and based on the past understanding of the events, response is initiated. The staging of response may differ due to lesser understanding of the severity/intensity of the event or due to no real time information management system from the impact zones/areas. Two of the agencies (MO Shimla and IDSP) currently providing these warnings realize the need for development of their products and services.

The lack of user needs assessment across all stakeholders could be the reason for isolated technology incorporation, product development, service delivery plans and integrated with the CDMP. Both MO Shimla and IDSP undertake awareness programmes on their respective subjects and, in addition, a wide range of departments in the state also conduct public awareness campaigns on life safety and preparedness (including drills) for earthquakes, landslides, cloud bursts/flash floods and fire.



**LEGEND:**

- Component 1: Governance
- Component 2: User Needs
- Component 3: Operational Components
- Component 4: Products and Services
- Component 5: Coordination Mechanism
- Component 6: Service Delivery & Feedback loop

**Preparedness Level**

- Little Progress/ Major concerns
- Partial Progress/ Minor concerns
- Good Progress/ On track

**Development Stage Indicators**




Figure 12: Preparedness of EWS indicators for Shimla

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS & OUTLOOK

Initial results of the review have been shared with the cities during discussion meeting with city stakeholders. Stakeholders from the cities have endorsed the results emanating from the review process. The following set of recommendations have been developed and presented for further action:

### Recommendations for improving the EWS for Urban Areas

#### National / State Institutions

1. State DM Plan should entrust ULB with the responsibility of developing city EWS for specific hazards.

2. For an integrated approach, SDMA should provide an enabling platform to debate, increase coordination and strengthen EWS links across all levels of the government, technical agencies (geological, hydro-meteorological, public health risks), private sector, city level institutions and non-government organizations.

3. IMD's Doppler radar system at city level or within the range of the city has proven to be quite beneficial during cyclone. While the plan to have a radar network is underway, fast-tracking of the same is the need of the hour.

4. IDSP's Health surveillances across cities are found to be relatively useful in detecting outbreaks, since they are directly linked to the state department. Currently, the paper-based approach has a turnaround time of 10 to 15 days for actions. Tools for real time monitoring should be considered.

5. Cities (not the state capital) have limited interactions with state agencies. There is need for enhanced coordination mechanism amongst DM Agencies and ULB.

6. There is a need to create discussion platform for deliberation and discussion between technical agencies (IMD, CWC, GSI, CESS, and INCOIS among others), State Departments and the ULB. In addition, there is a need to create an appropriate framework with due legal process to ensure that roles and responsibilities of the agencies are defined and executed.

#### Urban Local Bodies

7. The ULB/city government should earmark annual budget for development and maintenance of EWS (Capex & Opex).

8. ULB's DRR agenda should encompass EWS as a critical component. The city government should establish and provide operational services and guide the local development agenda/safeguard infrastructure – assets – communities at risk.

9. Institutionalization of EWS within ULB must ensure integration between line departments and technical agencies. Line departments, in turn, must focus on development of appropriate SOPs for EWS.

10. Cities should invest in a fully operation EOC (24X7) to support risk assessment and EWS. Trained manpower must run the centre's operations.

11. Capacity building of ULB/City Government on EWS (technical and management) is crucial for system development and implementation. The ULB should earmark funds for training so as to assist the process of strengthening the EOC, City

DM Plan, communities at risk, media, emergency responders and key stakeholders.

12. Awareness programme should aim at strengthening the level of preparedness. The programmes should be contextualized and scenario-based.

13. Networking and involvement with state, regional and national level institutions will strengthen EWS at city level. Networking brings in exchange of observation data, expertise, joint validation of modelling results, improved decision making, sharing of lessons learnt and best practices.

14. The ULB/city government should identify and link technical and resource institutions within the city for EWS operations.

15. A functional EWS puts forth the requirement to harmonize SOPs that determine response. Standardization of departmental plans and terminology ensures effective response actions. SOPs have to be evaluated and modified through conduct of drills.

16. ULB/City Government should develop hazard analysis, vulnerability assessment and risk assessment (on GIS platform). Climate variability and climate change should be an integral part of the risk assessment.

17. To strengthen disaster preparedness and emergency response, it is important to ensure that emergency response actions are guided through scientific and observed data. The city EOC should harmonize flow of information from all agencies and determine potential impact locations within the city



18. ULB/City Government requires real time data for a range of services (traffic, health, services monitoring – water/sanitation/solid waste management). There is a need to design and develop integrated hydro-meteorological, public health and environmental (say, air quality) monitoring systems in close cooperation with technical agencies, disaster risk management agencies and the ULB. Such an integrated system will be cost-effective and will ensure operations at all times.

19. Event preparedness meetings should be regularized: before winter (for snow/cold wave), summer (heat wave) and monsoon season (tropical cyclone). Pre-Monsoon Preparedness Forum has helped several cities minimize the risk (discussions around monsoon outlook, calibration of model results, preparedness plan).

20. Night time warning has to be an integral part of EWS. If need for evacuation arises, additional measures should be stepped in to stage emergency response. The city DM Plan should make a clear provision for night time warning.

21. Relay of warning information should use a wide variety of options. Select hot spot locations should be equipped with sirens. To maximize outreach of warnings to general public places (railway stations, bus stations/stops, important city junctions, city market places, parks etc.), display screens must be positioned with real time information.

22. Engagement of the media is important to build a culture of safety and resilience. An exclusive weather channel is recommended.

23. It is critical for City Government/ULB to invest in city-level climate scoping studies, promote

adaptation and resilience measures across key sectors and integrate with DRR and development planning.

#### **Technical Agencies**

24. The ULB and allied institutions require support from technical agencies to build the current understanding of hazard risks, DRR options, and expand the understanding to incorporate future threats of climate change and other hazards in decision making for new development and public safety.

25. Development of EWS (monitoring, impact forecasting, warning formulation) has to be hazard specific. EWS development should take into consideration predominant hazards and more frequent/less frequent events (but with a potential for severe damage).

26. Despite technical breakthroughs in earthquake EWS (alerts), efforts should be made by technical agencies to implement EWS in high seismic prone cities. Landslide EWS can be successful in conjunction with appropriate selection of land use criteria for landslide prone region, further combined with environmental monitoring of the risk prone areas.

27. Community-based monitoring has proved to be beneficial for management of geological hazards. A combination of technical and community-focused approach should be adopted for implementation.

28. User understanding of the forecast in technical terms is limited. This is evident from the current set of common information products shared with the user community. Therefore, translation of forecast to warning action has to be backed with action-based information in easy understandable language.

29. Warning mechanism should keep focus on communities at risk. A generic city-level warning may not be appropriate, given the diversity of the built environment in urban areas. In addition, customized local warnings have to be provided to hotspot locations.

30. Warning products should clearly indicate threats to the population/stakeholders. Efforts have to be made by the technical and disaster management agencies to tailor the warning that allows not only understanding the potential event but also determining the potent impact. The warning at the city level should highlight societal impacts and not be broad-based. Stakeholders should be able to distinguish between low impact and high impact events. At the city level, there has to be minimum ambiguity in information when shared with the general public. Communities at risk should be able to perceive risk and react appropriately.

31. Simple and easy to use visualization tools should be made available by technical and disaster management agencies to the citizens. This will ensure participation and effective decision-making.

## Summary

It is important at this stage to note that EWS in the seven cities needs to be upgraded significantly to meet the larger objective of reducing fatalities and protecting infrastructure/assets from future events. It is recognized globally that an operational EWS has the potential of minimizing loss and contributing to sustainable development and building resilience. While technology is available for establishing the robust communication system for EWS, it is the institutional foundation and the networking arrangements which have to be deep rooted for meeting the desired objectives of the system. All the key elements of the system have to be functional and it is important to review them annually by targeting for different scenarios and measuring performance.

This report provides insights to issues that need to be addressed for an operational EWS, defines the criteria and measures the development stage indicators for the present situation. The results of this review provide a status and the need to be aware of key design considerations for improvement of existing EWS, as well as for design and implementation of new EWS. It is envisaged that city landscape will have to tailor solutions for public safety, and EWS will be designed and developed on various platforms. It is important to keep these systems people-centric and subsequently build risk knowledge among the stakeholders for success of this system. Criteria Development Matrix can be used as a tool for further review. As EWS systems develop in the city, robust EWS audit mechanism can be rolled in the future to measure system efficiency.

# CASE STUDIES FOR ESTABLISHED EWS

## Case Study 1: Qinglong County Early Warning Success for M7.8 Earthquake



*Photograph: Students in Qinglong County had classes outdoors as the Great Tangshan Earthquake (GTE)*

**Project title:** Community Monitoring and Preparedness for Earthquakes

**Location & Country:** Northeast China

**Hazard type:** Earthquakes

**Stakeholders:** Local communities in China

**Period of Implementation:** 1966–1980

**Contact:**

Professor Jean J. Chu

Institute of Geology and Geophysics

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

Beijing, China

+86-136-9306-7556

E: [jeanjchu@gmail.com](mailto:jeanjchu@gmail.com)

**Description:**

When a strong earthquake killed over 2,40,000 people in Tangshan in 1976, an adjacent county escaped unscathed. All 4,70,000 residents of Qinglong County in the northeast corner of Tangshan survived the magnitude 7.8 quake except for one, who died of a heart attack. Even in Beijing, farther away from Tangshan than Qinglong, hundreds of people were killed by the Great Tangshan Earthquake (GTE). Qinglong, or blue dragon in Chinese, was not invincible to the tremendous power unleashed by this quake, as more than 1,80,000 of its buildings were destroyed, including 7000 which totally collapsed. What saved the day for these rural dwellers was a unique combination of environmental monitoring of nature's signals prior to the quake, and accessing scientific information on precursory changes in electrical resistivity and crustal stress. Local officials and county residents, including schoolchildren, were educated to make sense of all these data, and took effective preparatory measures in time.

*Case Study contributed by Prof. Jean Chu*

## Case Study 2: Community-based Earthquake Monitoring System in Xinjiang



*Photograph: Workshops, trains and local communities use computer software to analyse their recorded data*

**Project title:** Community-based Earthquake Monitoring System in Xinjiang (UNDP Project No. CPR/03/612)

**Location & Country:** Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China

**Hazard type:** Earthquake

**Stakeholders:** Local communities in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China

**Period of Implementation:** April–November 2003

**Contact:**

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+86-136-9306-7556  
E: jeanjchu@gmail.com

**Description:**

On 24 February 2003, a strong earthquake of M 6.8 struck Jiashi County in southwest Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China. In response, UNDP located funds and worked with China International Centre for Economic & Technical Exchanges (CICETE) and Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) to complete a nine-station community-based earthquake monitoring system. This system is presently in full operation and during its first four months was able to see ahead of the M 6.1 earthquake on 1 December 2003, which struck near Bole monitoring station in northwest Xinjiang. Nearly one-third of the staff involved in this nine-station system is women. Public disaster education drives, conducted during the project, involved 50 local government officials and over 700 schoolchildren. The total time taken, from conception to completion of this community-based earthquake monitoring system, was five months (April–September 2003). The project established CSCAN, the Crustal Stress Community Awareness Network, thus improving the capacity of local communities to monitor and prepare for earthquakes.

*Case Study contributed by Prof. Jean Chu*

### Case Study 3: Landslide Early Warning Network



Photograph (L): Installation of the rain gauge by DMR team. Also seen is the local community volunteer as part of the landslide watch network

Photograph (R): Rain gauge with warning thresholds determined for a particular location.

(Location: Mae Phun Sub-district, Lablae District, Uttaradit Province)

**Project title:** Landslide Early Warning Network

**Location & Country:** High risk prone areas across Thailand

**Hazard type:** Landslide

**Stakeholders:** Department of Mineral Resources, Local communities at risk

**Period of Implementation:** Ongoing

**Contact:**

Department of Mineral Resources  
 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment  
 75/10 Rama VI Road, Ratchatewi, Bangkok 10400  
[www.dmr.go.th](http://www.dmr.go.th)

**Description:**

Department of Mineral Resources has carried out study programmes to gain better understanding of such events and has set up activities for the prevention and mitigation of them via engineering. Most of the works undertaken by DMRs are based not only on scientific approach but also on people’s participation. DMR tried to make the best out of limited resources to sustain the geo-hazard management system of the local communities distributed throughout the country. A new concept has been developed under certain key concepts, which are: geological knowledge as a strong foundation, best engineering geological practice, HM King Bhumibhol’s sufficient economy, and living in harmony with nature. DMR promotes the role of people and local communities in warning and preparedness of the geo-hazard risk areas. DMR has set up landslide warning networks for both local and regional areas in the high risk areas throughout the country. The network has been set through a series of seminar meetings for capacity building of the local community with the supply of efficient equipment for the network group to be able to monitor rainfall and landslide in their areas. This activity is especially focussed during the rainy season of the year. This work has created awareness among people who have been or potentially been affected by such hazards to be well-prepared for the event that is yet to come.

*Case study contributed by Anup Karanth (Field Study undertaken in 2008)*

*Additional reading reference: Adichat SURINKUM Worawut Tantiwanit Jarin TULYATID, Prevention, Mitigation and Engineering Response for Geohazard in Thailand, Paper in the 6th International Conference in Geotechnical Engineering, Arlington, VA, 11–16 August 2008.*

## Case Study 4: Flood Control Centre



Photograph: Monitoring Street Flooding

Source: Screen Print of FMS, Last accessed on 20April2014

**Facility:** Flood Control Centre

**Location & Country:** Bangkok, Thailand

**Hazard type:** Flood

**Stakeholders:** Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Thai Meteorological Department, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Traffic Control Centre, Royal Irrigation Department

**Period of Implementation:** Since 2000

**Contact:** BMA City Hall, Dindaeng, Bangkok, Thailand 10400  
<http://dds.bangkok.go.th>; <http://www.bangkok.go.th>


### Description:

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration has set up Flood Control Centre (FCC). FCC supervises the hydrological conditions linking directly with the radar of Meteorology Department and of BMA. FCC has been serving as a decision-making tool for the Department of Drainage and Sewerage (DDS) flood protection teams for accurate and immediate directive to solve flood problems effectively. Monitoring stations monitor real time data of rainfall, water levels, pumps operation, water gates operation and water quality that are installed. In addition, the department is implementing a flood forecasting programme aiming at forecasting rainfall intensity and flood forecasting in 650 km<sup>2</sup> of the east bank area, which will enable BMA staffs to forecast flood condition three to six hours in advance. FCC serves people with flood forecasting news and flood protection and solution. Several communication channels are used to inform people and communities (radio broadcasting, traffic billboards and BMA's website). DDS has weather monitoring system (<http://dds.bangkok.go.th/wms/>); surveillance radar rain images (<http://dds.bangkok.go.th/Radar/radar.htm>); flood monitoring system (<http://dds.bangkok.go.th/Floodmon/>); water measurement system/canal overflow (<http://dds.bangkok.go.th/Canal/>); SCADA system (<http://dds.bangkok.go.th/scada/>); and plan to prevent and resolve flooding, among others.

Case study contributed by Anup Karanth (Institutional Landscaping Exercise for EWS, 2008)

Reference: <http://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/cities/view/28>

## Case Study 5: End-to-End Early Warning System for Ukai and Local Floods



Evacuation mapping for Ward 27 in Surat City

**Project title:** End-to-End Early Warning System for Ukai and Local Floods

**Location & Country:** Surat, India

**Hazard type:** Floods

**Stakeholders:** Surat Municipal Corporation, Surat Climate Change Trust, India Meteorological Department, TARU Leading Edge

**Period of Implementation:** 2011–2015

**Contact:**

Surat Climate Change Trust,  
Muglisara, Main Road,  
Surat – 395003 Gujarat, India  
[www.sccctrust.in](http://www.sccctrust.in)


### Description:

Over the past two decades, the flood frequency is increasing due to increased variability of rainfall (extreme events), especially within the Tapi river catchment. An End-to-End Early Warning System (an initiative under the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network) has been established in the city of Surat to manage floods caused by extreme precipitation events in the Upper and Middle Tapi basin as well as khadi (tidal creeks) floods. The main objective of this project is to reduce the intensity of floods and resultant flood damage to Surat through improved reservoir operation to minimize peak floods and systems to enable institutions and society to handle flood emergencies. Key project components include: developing management framework for EWS; establishment of Surat Climate Change Trust and Technical Committee, climate change informed hydrological and hydraulic modelling, early warning and disaster management system, integration with City Disaster Management Plan, information and support for the poor and sustainability arrangements. The establishment of the warning system includes the installation of weather systems, data transfer mechanism from catchment to reservoir to city, development of weather and flow prediction models, improvement of existing flood preparedness and action plans.

Reference: Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, [www.acccrn.org](http://www.acccrn.org)



## Case Study 6: Urban Services Monitoring System



Photograph: Screen Print of Urban Services Monitoring System

**Project title:** Urban Services Monitoring System (Health Component)

**Location & Country:** Surat, India

**Hazard type:** Diseases

**Stakeholders:** Health Department (Surat Municipal Corporation), TARU Leading Edge

**Period of Implementation:** 2009–2013

**Contact:**

Surat Municipal Corporation

Muglisara, Main Road,

Surat – 395003 Gujarat, India

[www.suratmunicipal.gov.in](http://www.suratmunicipal.gov.in); <http://surat.ursms.net/cms/home.aspx>

**Description:**

High density, lack of safe water supply and its location on a river side, combined with high temperatures and humidity, changing rainfall patterns, rapid urban growth and industrial development make Surat highly conducive to vector-borne and water-borne diseases. Real time structured data collection from different health institutions, including Urban Health Centres (UHCs), government and private hospitals, laboratories and private practitioners and its efficient analysis were the key challenges faced by Health Department, Surat Municipal Corporation. To overcome the above challenge, short message service (SMS)-enabled integrated Urban Services Monitoring System (UrSMS) was conceptualized and developed for the Surat Municipal Corporation. This system brings resilience to disease monitoring framework by providing timely information on the quality of water supplied from distribution stations and occurrence including outbreak of diseases within Surat. The near real time data collection and analysis is currently helping the health department predict disease outbreaks based on number/distribution of cases across the city and enables them take prompt action to prevent further spreading. The system provides better visualisation of data and integration with ongoing government programmes/schemes. So far, the system has been able to significantly reduce the number of patients affected by malaria, dengue and leptospirosis.

Reference: Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, [www.aaccrn.org](http://www.aaccrn.org)

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# ANNEXURE

List of Agencies and Key Informants Consulted in the Review Process

## Shimla

Key Informant	Position	Department/ Organization
Amandeep Garg	Special Secretary (Revenue-DMC)	Department of Revenue
Dinesh Malhotra	Deputy Commissioner, District Shimla	Deputy Commissioner Office
Neeraj Kumar	Additional District Magistrate, District Shimla	Deputy Commissioner Office
Tikender Panwar	Deputy Mayor	Municipal Corporation Shimla
Naresh Thakur	Assistant Commissioner	Municipal Corporation Shimla
Dr Suresh C. Attri		
	Principal Scientific Officer (Environment)	Department of Environment, Science and Technology
Dr Rajesh Guleri	SSO	IDSP, Directorate of Health Services; Officer on Special Duty NRHM
Dr Umesh K. Bharti	Medical Health Officer	Municipal Corporation Shimla
Harminder Dutta	Scientific Assistant	Meteorological Centre (IMD) Shimla
Rajneesh Sharma	Geologist	Department of Industries
Dr S S Negi	Director	Department of Environment Science and Technology
Dr Kamraja Kaisth		State Council for Science Technology and Environment
Navneey Yadav	Consultant	TARU Leading edge Pvt. Ltd.
Bhavna Karki	City Project Coordinator	UNDP India

